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"""
FormWizard class - - implements a multi - page form , validating between each
step and storing the form ' s state as HTML hidden fields so that no state is
stored on the server side .
"""
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import cPickle as pickle
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from django import forms
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from django . conf import settings
Fixed #14445 - Use HMAC and constant-time comparison functions where needed.
All adhoc MAC applications have been updated to use HMAC, using SHA1 to
generate unique keys for each application based on the SECRET_KEY, which is
common practice for this situation. In all cases, backwards compatibility
with existing hashes has been maintained, aiming to phase this out as per
the normal deprecation process. In this way, under most normal
circumstances the old hashes will have expired (e.g. by session expiration
etc.) before they become invalid.
In the case of the messages framework and the cookie backend, which was
already using HMAC, there is the possibility of a backwards incompatibility
if the SECRET_KEY is shorter than the default 50 bytes, but the low
likelihood and low impact meant compatibility code was not worth it.
All known instances where tokens/hashes were compared using simple string
equality, which could potentially open timing based attacks, have also been
fixed using a constant-time comparison function.
There are no known practical attacks against the existing implementations,
so these security improvements will not be backported.
git-svn-id: http://code.djangoproject.com/svn/django/trunk@14218 bcc190cf-cafb-0310-a4f2-bffc1f526a37
2010-10-15 04:54:30 +08:00
from django . contrib . formtools . utils import security_hash , form_hmac
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from django . http import Http404
from django . shortcuts import render_to_response
from django . template . context import RequestContext
Fixed #14445 - Use HMAC and constant-time comparison functions where needed.
All adhoc MAC applications have been updated to use HMAC, using SHA1 to
generate unique keys for each application based on the SECRET_KEY, which is
common practice for this situation. In all cases, backwards compatibility
with existing hashes has been maintained, aiming to phase this out as per
the normal deprecation process. In this way, under most normal
circumstances the old hashes will have expired (e.g. by session expiration
etc.) before they become invalid.
In the case of the messages framework and the cookie backend, which was
already using HMAC, there is the possibility of a backwards incompatibility
if the SECRET_KEY is shorter than the default 50 bytes, but the low
likelihood and low impact meant compatibility code was not worth it.
All known instances where tokens/hashes were compared using simple string
equality, which could potentially open timing based attacks, have also been
fixed using a constant-time comparison function.
There are no known practical attacks against the existing implementations,
so these security improvements will not be backported.
git-svn-id: http://code.djangoproject.com/svn/django/trunk@14218 bcc190cf-cafb-0310-a4f2-bffc1f526a37
2010-10-15 04:54:30 +08:00
from django . utils . crypto import constant_time_compare
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from django . utils . hashcompat import md5_constructor
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from django . utils . translation import ugettext_lazy as _
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from django . utils . decorators import method_decorator
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from django . views . decorators . csrf import csrf_protect
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class FormWizard ( object ) :
# The HTML (and POST data) field name for the "step" variable.
step_field_name = " wizard_step "
# METHODS SUBCLASSES SHOULDN'T OVERRIDE ###################################
def __init__ ( self , form_list , initial = None ) :
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"""
Start a new wizard with a list of forms .
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form_list should be a list of Form classes ( not instances ) .
"""
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self . form_list = form_list [ : ]
self . initial = initial or { }
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# Dictionary of extra template context variables.
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self . extra_context = { }
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# A zero-based counter keeping track of which step we're in.
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self . step = 0
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def __repr__ ( self ) :
return " step: %d \n form_list: %s \n initial_data: %s " % ( self . step , self . form_list , self . initial )
def get_form ( self , step , data = None ) :
" Helper method that returns the Form instance for the given step. "
return self . form_list [ step ] ( data , prefix = self . prefix_for_step ( step ) , initial = self . initial . get ( step , None ) )
def num_steps ( self ) :
" Helper method that returns the number of steps. "
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# You might think we should just set "self.num_steps = len(form_list)"
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# in __init__(), but this calculation needs to be dynamic, because some
# hook methods might alter self.form_list.
return len ( self . form_list )
Fixed #14445 - Use HMAC and constant-time comparison functions where needed.
All adhoc MAC applications have been updated to use HMAC, using SHA1 to
generate unique keys for each application based on the SECRET_KEY, which is
common practice for this situation. In all cases, backwards compatibility
with existing hashes has been maintained, aiming to phase this out as per
the normal deprecation process. In this way, under most normal
circumstances the old hashes will have expired (e.g. by session expiration
etc.) before they become invalid.
In the case of the messages framework and the cookie backend, which was
already using HMAC, there is the possibility of a backwards incompatibility
if the SECRET_KEY is shorter than the default 50 bytes, but the low
likelihood and low impact meant compatibility code was not worth it.
All known instances where tokens/hashes were compared using simple string
equality, which could potentially open timing based attacks, have also been
fixed using a constant-time comparison function.
There are no known practical attacks against the existing implementations,
so these security improvements will not be backported.
git-svn-id: http://code.djangoproject.com/svn/django/trunk@14218 bcc190cf-cafb-0310-a4f2-bffc1f526a37
2010-10-15 04:54:30 +08:00
def _check_security_hash ( self , token , request , form ) :
expected = self . security_hash ( request , form )
if constant_time_compare ( token , expected ) :
return True
else :
# Fall back to Django 1.2 method, for compatibility with forms that
# are in the middle of being used when the upgrade occurs. However,
# we don't want to do this fallback if a subclass has provided their
# own security_hash method - because they might have implemented a
# more secure method, and this would punch a hole in that.
# PendingDeprecationWarning <- left here to remind us that this
# compatibility fallback should be removed in Django 1.5
FormWizard_expected = FormWizard . security_hash ( self , request , form )
if expected == FormWizard_expected :
# They didn't override security_hash, do the fallback:
old_expected = security_hash ( request , form )
return constant_time_compare ( token , old_expected )
else :
return False
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@method_decorator ( csrf_protect )
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def __call__ ( self , request , * args , * * kwargs ) :
"""
Main method that does all the hard work , conforming to the Django view
interface .
"""
if ' extra_context ' in kwargs :
self . extra_context . update ( kwargs [ ' extra_context ' ] )
current_step = self . determine_step ( request , * args , * * kwargs )
self . parse_params ( request , * args , * * kwargs )
# Sanity check.
if current_step > = self . num_steps ( ) :
raise Http404 ( ' Step %s does not exist ' % current_step )
# For each previous step, verify the hash and process.
# TODO: Move "hash_%d" to a method to make it configurable.
for i in range ( current_step ) :
form = self . get_form ( i , request . POST )
Fixed #14445 - Use HMAC and constant-time comparison functions where needed.
All adhoc MAC applications have been updated to use HMAC, using SHA1 to
generate unique keys for each application based on the SECRET_KEY, which is
common practice for this situation. In all cases, backwards compatibility
with existing hashes has been maintained, aiming to phase this out as per
the normal deprecation process. In this way, under most normal
circumstances the old hashes will have expired (e.g. by session expiration
etc.) before they become invalid.
In the case of the messages framework and the cookie backend, which was
already using HMAC, there is the possibility of a backwards incompatibility
if the SECRET_KEY is shorter than the default 50 bytes, but the low
likelihood and low impact meant compatibility code was not worth it.
All known instances where tokens/hashes were compared using simple string
equality, which could potentially open timing based attacks, have also been
fixed using a constant-time comparison function.
There are no known practical attacks against the existing implementations,
so these security improvements will not be backported.
git-svn-id: http://code.djangoproject.com/svn/django/trunk@14218 bcc190cf-cafb-0310-a4f2-bffc1f526a37
2010-10-15 04:54:30 +08:00
if not self . _check_security_hash ( request . POST . get ( " hash_ %d " % i , ' ' ) , request , form ) :
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return self . render_hash_failure ( request , i )
self . process_step ( request , form , i )
# Process the current step. If it's valid, go to the next step or call
# done(), depending on whether any steps remain.
if request . method == ' POST ' :
form = self . get_form ( current_step , request . POST )
else :
form = self . get_form ( current_step )
if form . is_valid ( ) :
self . process_step ( request , form , current_step )
next_step = current_step + 1
# If this was the last step, validate all of the forms one more
# time, as a sanity check, and call done().
num = self . num_steps ( )
if next_step == num :
final_form_list = [ self . get_form ( i , request . POST ) for i in range ( num ) ]
# Validate all the forms. If any of them fail validation, that
# must mean the validator relied on some other input, such as
# an external Web site.
Fixed #14445 - Use HMAC and constant-time comparison functions where needed.
All adhoc MAC applications have been updated to use HMAC, using SHA1 to
generate unique keys for each application based on the SECRET_KEY, which is
common practice for this situation. In all cases, backwards compatibility
with existing hashes has been maintained, aiming to phase this out as per
the normal deprecation process. In this way, under most normal
circumstances the old hashes will have expired (e.g. by session expiration
etc.) before they become invalid.
In the case of the messages framework and the cookie backend, which was
already using HMAC, there is the possibility of a backwards incompatibility
if the SECRET_KEY is shorter than the default 50 bytes, but the low
likelihood and low impact meant compatibility code was not worth it.
All known instances where tokens/hashes were compared using simple string
equality, which could potentially open timing based attacks, have also been
fixed using a constant-time comparison function.
There are no known practical attacks against the existing implementations,
so these security improvements will not be backported.
git-svn-id: http://code.djangoproject.com/svn/django/trunk@14218 bcc190cf-cafb-0310-a4f2-bffc1f526a37
2010-10-15 04:54:30 +08:00
# It is also possible that validation might fail under certain
# attack situations: an attacker might be able to bypass previous
# stages, and generate correct security hashes for all the
# skipped stages by virtue of:
# 1) having filled out an identical form which doesn't have the
# validation (and does something different at the end),
# 2) or having filled out a previous version of the same form
# which had some validation missing,
# 3) or previously having filled out the form when they had
# more privileges than they do now.
#
# Since the hashes only take into account values, and not other
# other validation the form might do, we must re-do validation
# now for security reasons.
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for i , f in enumerate ( final_form_list ) :
if not f . is_valid ( ) :
return self . render_revalidation_failure ( request , i , f )
return self . done ( request , final_form_list )
# Otherwise, move along to the next step.
else :
form = self . get_form ( next_step )
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self . step = current_step = next_step
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return self . render ( form , request , current_step )
def render ( self , form , request , step , context = None ) :
" Renders the given Form object, returning an HttpResponse. "
old_data = request . POST
prev_fields = [ ]
if old_data :
hidden = forms . HiddenInput ( )
# Collect all data from previous steps and render it as HTML hidden fields.
for i in range ( step ) :
old_form = self . get_form ( i , old_data )
hash_name = ' hash_ %s ' % i
prev_fields . extend ( [ bf . as_hidden ( ) for bf in old_form ] )
prev_fields . append ( hidden . render ( hash_name , old_data . get ( hash_name , self . security_hash ( request , old_form ) ) ) )
return self . render_template ( request , form , ' ' . join ( prev_fields ) , step , context )
# METHODS SUBCLASSES MIGHT OVERRIDE IF APPROPRIATE ########################
def prefix_for_step ( self , step ) :
" Given the step, returns a Form prefix to use. "
return str ( step )
def render_hash_failure ( self , request , step ) :
"""
Hook for rendering a template if a hash check failed .
step is the step that failed . Any previous step is guaranteed to be
valid .
This default implementation simply renders the form for the given step ,
but subclasses may want to display an error message , etc .
"""
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return self . render ( self . get_form ( step ) , request , step , context = { ' wizard_error ' : _ ( ' We apologize, but your form has expired. Please continue filling out the form from this page. ' ) } )
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def render_revalidation_failure ( self , request , step , form ) :
"""
Hook for rendering a template if final revalidation failed .
It is highly unlikely that this point would ever be reached , but See
the comment in __call__ ( ) for an explanation .
"""
return self . render ( form , request , step )
def security_hash ( self , request , form ) :
"""
Calculates the security hash for the given HttpRequest and Form instances .
Subclasses may want to take into account request - specific information ,
such as the IP address .
"""
Fixed #14445 - Use HMAC and constant-time comparison functions where needed.
All adhoc MAC applications have been updated to use HMAC, using SHA1 to
generate unique keys for each application based on the SECRET_KEY, which is
common practice for this situation. In all cases, backwards compatibility
with existing hashes has been maintained, aiming to phase this out as per
the normal deprecation process. In this way, under most normal
circumstances the old hashes will have expired (e.g. by session expiration
etc.) before they become invalid.
In the case of the messages framework and the cookie backend, which was
already using HMAC, there is the possibility of a backwards incompatibility
if the SECRET_KEY is shorter than the default 50 bytes, but the low
likelihood and low impact meant compatibility code was not worth it.
All known instances where tokens/hashes were compared using simple string
equality, which could potentially open timing based attacks, have also been
fixed using a constant-time comparison function.
There are no known practical attacks against the existing implementations,
so these security improvements will not be backported.
git-svn-id: http://code.djangoproject.com/svn/django/trunk@14218 bcc190cf-cafb-0310-a4f2-bffc1f526a37
2010-10-15 04:54:30 +08:00
return form_hmac ( form )
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def determine_step ( self , request , * args , * * kwargs ) :
"""
Given the request object and whatever * args and * * kwargs were passed to
__call__ ( ) , returns the current step ( which is zero - based ) .
Note that the result should not be trusted . It may even be a completely
invalid number . It ' s not the job of this method to validate it.
"""
if not request . POST :
return 0
try :
step = int ( request . POST . get ( self . step_field_name , 0 ) )
except ValueError :
return 0
return step
def parse_params ( self , request , * args , * * kwargs ) :
"""
Hook for setting some state , given the request object and whatever
* args and * * kwargs were passed to __call__ ( ) , sets some state .
This is called at the beginning of __call__ ( ) .
"""
pass
def get_template ( self , step ) :
"""
Hook for specifying the name of the template to use for a given step .
Note that this can return a tuple of template names if you ' d like to
use the template system ' s select_template() hook.
"""
return ' forms/wizard.html '
def render_template ( self , request , form , previous_fields , step , context = None ) :
"""
Renders the template for the given step , returning an HttpResponse object .
Override this method if you want to add a custom context , return a
different MIME type , etc . If you only need to override the template
name , use get_template ( ) instead .
The template will be rendered with the following context :
step_field - - The name of the hidden field containing the step .
step0 - - The current step ( zero - based ) .
step - - The current step ( one - based ) .
step_count - - The total number of steps .
form - - The Form instance for the current step ( either empty
or with errors ) .
previous_fields - - A string representing every previous data field ,
plus hashes for completed forms , all in the form of
hidden fields . Note that you ' ll need to run this
through the " safe " template filter , to prevent
auto - escaping , because it ' s raw HTML.
"""
context = context or { }
context . update ( self . extra_context )
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return render_to_response ( self . get_template ( step ) , dict ( context ,
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step_field = self . step_field_name ,
step0 = step ,
step = step + 1 ,
step_count = self . num_steps ( ) ,
form = form ,
previous_fields = previous_fields
) , context_instance = RequestContext ( request ) )
def process_step ( self , request , form , step ) :
"""
Hook for modifying the FormWizard ' s internal state, given a fully
validated Form object . The Form is guaranteed to have clean , valid
data .
This method should * not * modify any of that data . Rather , it might want
to set self . extra_context or dynamically alter self . form_list , based on
previously submitted forms .
Note that this method is called every time a page is rendered for * all *
submitted steps .
"""
pass
# METHODS SUBCLASSES MUST OVERRIDE ########################################
def done ( self , request , form_list ) :
"""
Hook for doing something with the validated data . This is responsible
for the final processing .
form_list is a list of Form instances , each containing clean , valid
data .
"""
raise NotImplementedError ( " Your %s class has not defined a done() method, which is required. " % self . __class__ . __name__ )