2014-11-26 06:06:31 +08:00
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===========================
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Django 1.6.10 release notes
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===========================
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*Under development*
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Django 1.6.10 fixes several security issues in 1.6.9.
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2014-09-11 01:06:19 +08:00
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WSGI header spoofing via underscore/dash conflation
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===================================================
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When HTTP headers are placed into the WSGI environ, they are normalized by
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converting to uppercase, converting all dashes to underscores, and prepending
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`HTTP_`. For instance, a header ``X-Auth-User`` would become
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``HTTP_X_AUTH_USER`` in the WSGI environ (and thus also in Django's
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``request.META`` dictionary).
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Unfortunately, this means that the WSGI environ cannot distinguish between
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headers containing dashes and headers containing underscores: ``X-Auth-User``
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and ``X-Auth_User`` both become ``HTTP_X_AUTH_USER``. This means that if a
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header is used in a security-sensitive way (for instance, passing
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authentication information along from a front-end proxy), even if the proxy
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carefully strips any incoming value for ``X-Auth-User``, an attacker may be
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able to provide an ``X-Auth_User`` header (with underscore) and bypass this
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protection.
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In order to prevent such attacks, both Nginx and Apache 2.4+ strip all headers
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containing underscores from incoming requests by default. Django's built-in
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development server now does the same. Django's development server is not
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recommended for production use, but matching the behavior of common production
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servers reduces the surface area for behavior changes during deployment.
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2014-12-04 05:14:00 +08:00
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Mitigated possible XSS attack via user-supplied redirect URLs
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=============================================================
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Django relies on user input in some cases (e.g.
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:func:`django.contrib.auth.views.login` and :doc:`i18n </topics/i18n/index>`)
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to redirect the user to an "on success" URL. The security checks for these
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redirects (namely ``django.util.http.is_safe_url()``) didn't strip leading
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whitespace on the tested URL and as such considered URLs like
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``\njavascript:...`` safe. If a developer relied on ``is_safe_url()`` to
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provide safe redirect targets and put such a URL into a link, they could suffer
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from a XSS attack. This bug doesn't affect Django currently, since we only put
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this URL into the ``Location`` response header and browsers seem to ignore
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JavaScript there.
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