Fixed #14445 - Use HMAC and constant-time comparison functions where needed.
All adhoc MAC applications have been updated to use HMAC, using SHA1 to
generate unique keys for each application based on the SECRET_KEY, which is
common practice for this situation. In all cases, backwards compatibility
with existing hashes has been maintained, aiming to phase this out as per
the normal deprecation process. In this way, under most normal
circumstances the old hashes will have expired (e.g. by session expiration
etc.) before they become invalid.
In the case of the messages framework and the cookie backend, which was
already using HMAC, there is the possibility of a backwards incompatibility
if the SECRET_KEY is shorter than the default 50 bytes, but the low
likelihood and low impact meant compatibility code was not worth it.
All known instances where tokens/hashes were compared using simple string
equality, which could potentially open timing based attacks, have also been
fixed using a constant-time comparison function.
There are no known practical attacks against the existing implementations,
so these security improvements will not be backported.
git-svn-id: http://code.djangoproject.com/svn/django/trunk@14218 bcc190cf-cafb-0310-a4f2-bffc1f526a37
2010-10-15 04:54:30 +08:00
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"""
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Django's standard crypto functions and utilities.
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"""
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2015-01-28 20:35:27 +08:00
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import hashlib
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2011-03-28 10:11:19 +08:00
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import hmac
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2015-01-28 20:35:27 +08:00
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import random
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2012-02-24 06:51:14 +08:00
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import time
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2012-02-24 05:39:12 +08:00
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2015-01-28 20:35:27 +08:00
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from django.conf import settings
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from django.utils.encoding import force_bytes
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2012-02-24 06:51:14 +08:00
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# Use the system PRNG if possible
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2012-02-24 05:39:12 +08:00
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try:
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random = random.SystemRandom()
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2012-02-24 06:51:14 +08:00
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using_sysrandom = True
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2012-02-24 05:39:12 +08:00
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except NotImplementedError:
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2012-02-24 06:51:14 +08:00
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import warnings
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warnings.warn('A secure pseudo-random number generator is not available '
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'on your system. Falling back to Mersenne Twister.')
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using_sysrandom = False
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2012-02-24 05:39:12 +08:00
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2011-12-23 11:46:06 +08:00
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Fixed #14445 - Use HMAC and constant-time comparison functions where needed.
All adhoc MAC applications have been updated to use HMAC, using SHA1 to
generate unique keys for each application based on the SECRET_KEY, which is
common practice for this situation. In all cases, backwards compatibility
with existing hashes has been maintained, aiming to phase this out as per
the normal deprecation process. In this way, under most normal
circumstances the old hashes will have expired (e.g. by session expiration
etc.) before they become invalid.
In the case of the messages framework and the cookie backend, which was
already using HMAC, there is the possibility of a backwards incompatibility
if the SECRET_KEY is shorter than the default 50 bytes, but the low
likelihood and low impact meant compatibility code was not worth it.
All known instances where tokens/hashes were compared using simple string
equality, which could potentially open timing based attacks, have also been
fixed using a constant-time comparison function.
There are no known practical attacks against the existing implementations,
so these security improvements will not be backported.
git-svn-id: http://code.djangoproject.com/svn/django/trunk@14218 bcc190cf-cafb-0310-a4f2-bffc1f526a37
2010-10-15 04:54:30 +08:00
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def salted_hmac(key_salt, value, secret=None):
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"""
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2017-01-25 04:32:33 +08:00
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Return the HMAC-SHA1 of 'value', using a key generated from key_salt and a
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Fixed #14445 - Use HMAC and constant-time comparison functions where needed.
All adhoc MAC applications have been updated to use HMAC, using SHA1 to
generate unique keys for each application based on the SECRET_KEY, which is
common practice for this situation. In all cases, backwards compatibility
with existing hashes has been maintained, aiming to phase this out as per
the normal deprecation process. In this way, under most normal
circumstances the old hashes will have expired (e.g. by session expiration
etc.) before they become invalid.
In the case of the messages framework and the cookie backend, which was
already using HMAC, there is the possibility of a backwards incompatibility
if the SECRET_KEY is shorter than the default 50 bytes, but the low
likelihood and low impact meant compatibility code was not worth it.
All known instances where tokens/hashes were compared using simple string
equality, which could potentially open timing based attacks, have also been
fixed using a constant-time comparison function.
There are no known practical attacks against the existing implementations,
so these security improvements will not be backported.
git-svn-id: http://code.djangoproject.com/svn/django/trunk@14218 bcc190cf-cafb-0310-a4f2-bffc1f526a37
2010-10-15 04:54:30 +08:00
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secret (which defaults to settings.SECRET_KEY).
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A different key_salt should be passed in for every application of HMAC.
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"""
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if secret is None:
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secret = settings.SECRET_KEY
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2014-02-16 21:47:51 +08:00
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key_salt = force_bytes(key_salt)
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secret = force_bytes(secret)
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Fixed #14445 - Use HMAC and constant-time comparison functions where needed.
All adhoc MAC applications have been updated to use HMAC, using SHA1 to
generate unique keys for each application based on the SECRET_KEY, which is
common practice for this situation. In all cases, backwards compatibility
with existing hashes has been maintained, aiming to phase this out as per
the normal deprecation process. In this way, under most normal
circumstances the old hashes will have expired (e.g. by session expiration
etc.) before they become invalid.
In the case of the messages framework and the cookie backend, which was
already using HMAC, there is the possibility of a backwards incompatibility
if the SECRET_KEY is shorter than the default 50 bytes, but the low
likelihood and low impact meant compatibility code was not worth it.
All known instances where tokens/hashes were compared using simple string
equality, which could potentially open timing based attacks, have also been
fixed using a constant-time comparison function.
There are no known practical attacks against the existing implementations,
so these security improvements will not be backported.
git-svn-id: http://code.djangoproject.com/svn/django/trunk@14218 bcc190cf-cafb-0310-a4f2-bffc1f526a37
2010-10-15 04:54:30 +08:00
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# We need to generate a derived key from our base key. We can do this by
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# passing the key_salt and our base key through a pseudo-random function and
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# SHA1 works nicely.
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2014-02-16 21:47:51 +08:00
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key = hashlib.sha1(key_salt + secret).digest()
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Fixed #14445 - Use HMAC and constant-time comparison functions where needed.
All adhoc MAC applications have been updated to use HMAC, using SHA1 to
generate unique keys for each application based on the SECRET_KEY, which is
common practice for this situation. In all cases, backwards compatibility
with existing hashes has been maintained, aiming to phase this out as per
the normal deprecation process. In this way, under most normal
circumstances the old hashes will have expired (e.g. by session expiration
etc.) before they become invalid.
In the case of the messages framework and the cookie backend, which was
already using HMAC, there is the possibility of a backwards incompatibility
if the SECRET_KEY is shorter than the default 50 bytes, but the low
likelihood and low impact meant compatibility code was not worth it.
All known instances where tokens/hashes were compared using simple string
equality, which could potentially open timing based attacks, have also been
fixed using a constant-time comparison function.
There are no known practical attacks against the existing implementations,
so these security improvements will not be backported.
git-svn-id: http://code.djangoproject.com/svn/django/trunk@14218 bcc190cf-cafb-0310-a4f2-bffc1f526a37
2010-10-15 04:54:30 +08:00
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# If len(key_salt + secret) > sha_constructor().block_size, the above
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# line is redundant and could be replaced by key = key_salt + secret, since
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# the hmac module does the same thing for keys longer than the block size.
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# However, we need to ensure that we *always* do this.
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2012-08-29 02:59:56 +08:00
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return hmac.new(key, msg=force_bytes(value), digestmod=hashlib.sha1)
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Fixed #14445 - Use HMAC and constant-time comparison functions where needed.
All adhoc MAC applications have been updated to use HMAC, using SHA1 to
generate unique keys for each application based on the SECRET_KEY, which is
common practice for this situation. In all cases, backwards compatibility
with existing hashes has been maintained, aiming to phase this out as per
the normal deprecation process. In this way, under most normal
circumstances the old hashes will have expired (e.g. by session expiration
etc.) before they become invalid.
In the case of the messages framework and the cookie backend, which was
already using HMAC, there is the possibility of a backwards incompatibility
if the SECRET_KEY is shorter than the default 50 bytes, but the low
likelihood and low impact meant compatibility code was not worth it.
All known instances where tokens/hashes were compared using simple string
equality, which could potentially open timing based attacks, have also been
fixed using a constant-time comparison function.
There are no known practical attacks against the existing implementations,
so these security improvements will not be backported.
git-svn-id: http://code.djangoproject.com/svn/django/trunk@14218 bcc190cf-cafb-0310-a4f2-bffc1f526a37
2010-10-15 04:54:30 +08:00
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2011-12-23 11:46:06 +08:00
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2012-02-11 12:18:15 +08:00
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def get_random_string(length=12,
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allowed_chars='abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz'
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'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789'):
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2011-12-23 11:46:06 +08:00
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"""
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2017-01-25 04:32:33 +08:00
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Return a securely generated random string.
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2011-12-23 11:46:06 +08:00
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The default length of 12 with the a-z, A-Z, 0-9 character set returns
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2012-02-24 05:39:12 +08:00
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a 71-bit value. log_2((26+26+10)^12) =~ 71 bits
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2011-12-23 11:46:06 +08:00
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"""
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2012-02-24 06:51:14 +08:00
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if not using_sysrandom:
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# This is ugly, and a hack, but it makes things better than
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# the alternative of predictability. This re-seeds the PRNG
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# using a value that is hard for an attacker to predict, every
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# time a random string is required. This may change the
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# properties of the chosen random sequence slightly, but this
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# is better than absolute predictability.
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random.seed(
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hashlib.sha256(
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2017-02-08 01:05:47 +08:00
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('%s%s%s' % (random.getstate(), time.time(), settings.SECRET_KEY)).encode()
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).digest()
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)
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2013-08-30 07:20:00 +08:00
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return ''.join(random.choice(allowed_chars) for i in range(length))
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2011-12-23 11:46:06 +08:00
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2017-01-20 00:55:23 +08:00
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def constant_time_compare(val1, val2):
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"""Return True if the two strings are equal, False otherwise."""
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return hmac.compare_digest(force_bytes(val1), force_bytes(val2))
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Fixed #14445 - Use HMAC and constant-time comparison functions where needed.
All adhoc MAC applications have been updated to use HMAC, using SHA1 to
generate unique keys for each application based on the SECRET_KEY, which is
common practice for this situation. In all cases, backwards compatibility
with existing hashes has been maintained, aiming to phase this out as per
the normal deprecation process. In this way, under most normal
circumstances the old hashes will have expired (e.g. by session expiration
etc.) before they become invalid.
In the case of the messages framework and the cookie backend, which was
already using HMAC, there is the possibility of a backwards incompatibility
if the SECRET_KEY is shorter than the default 50 bytes, but the low
likelihood and low impact meant compatibility code was not worth it.
All known instances where tokens/hashes were compared using simple string
equality, which could potentially open timing based attacks, have also been
fixed using a constant-time comparison function.
There are no known practical attacks against the existing implementations,
so these security improvements will not be backported.
git-svn-id: http://code.djangoproject.com/svn/django/trunk@14218 bcc190cf-cafb-0310-a4f2-bffc1f526a37
2010-10-15 04:54:30 +08:00
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2013-03-18 05:14:14 +08:00
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2017-01-20 00:55:23 +08:00
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def pbkdf2(password, salt, iterations, dklen=0, digest=None):
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"""Return the hash of password using pbkdf2."""
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if digest is None:
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digest = hashlib.sha256
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if not dklen:
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dklen = None
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password = force_bytes(password)
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salt = force_bytes(salt)
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return hashlib.pbkdf2_hmac(digest().name, password, salt, iterations, dklen)
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