2008-08-26 06:14:22 +08:00
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import datetime
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2011-03-28 09:40:43 +08:00
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import hashlib
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import time
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2008-08-26 06:14:22 +08:00
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from django import forms
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from django.forms.util import ErrorDict
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from django.conf import settings
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from django.contrib.contenttypes.models import ContentType
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from models import Comment
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Fixed #14445 - Use HMAC and constant-time comparison functions where needed.
All adhoc MAC applications have been updated to use HMAC, using SHA1 to
generate unique keys for each application based on the SECRET_KEY, which is
common practice for this situation. In all cases, backwards compatibility
with existing hashes has been maintained, aiming to phase this out as per
the normal deprecation process. In this way, under most normal
circumstances the old hashes will have expired (e.g. by session expiration
etc.) before they become invalid.
In the case of the messages framework and the cookie backend, which was
already using HMAC, there is the possibility of a backwards incompatibility
if the SECRET_KEY is shorter than the default 50 bytes, but the low
likelihood and low impact meant compatibility code was not worth it.
All known instances where tokens/hashes were compared using simple string
equality, which could potentially open timing based attacks, have also been
fixed using a constant-time comparison function.
There are no known practical attacks against the existing implementations,
so these security improvements will not be backported.
git-svn-id: http://code.djangoproject.com/svn/django/trunk@14218 bcc190cf-cafb-0310-a4f2-bffc1f526a37
2010-10-15 04:54:30 +08:00
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from django.utils.crypto import salted_hmac, constant_time_compare
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2008-09-02 01:23:09 +08:00
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from django.utils.encoding import force_unicode
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2008-08-26 06:14:22 +08:00
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from django.utils.text import get_text_list
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2008-10-05 13:05:32 +08:00
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from django.utils.translation import ungettext, ugettext_lazy as _
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2008-08-26 06:14:22 +08:00
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COMMENT_MAX_LENGTH = getattr(settings,'COMMENT_MAX_LENGTH', 3000)
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2009-03-21 21:45:31 +08:00
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class CommentSecurityForm(forms.Form):
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"""
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Handles the security aspects (anti-spoofing) for comment forms.
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"""
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2008-08-26 06:14:22 +08:00
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content_type = forms.CharField(widget=forms.HiddenInput)
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object_pk = forms.CharField(widget=forms.HiddenInput)
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timestamp = forms.IntegerField(widget=forms.HiddenInput)
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security_hash = forms.CharField(min_length=40, max_length=40, widget=forms.HiddenInput)
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def __init__(self, target_object, data=None, initial=None):
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self.target_object = target_object
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if initial is None:
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initial = {}
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initial.update(self.generate_security_data())
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2009-03-21 21:45:31 +08:00
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super(CommentSecurityForm, self).__init__(data=data, initial=initial)
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2009-12-22 23:18:51 +08:00
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2009-03-21 21:45:31 +08:00
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def security_errors(self):
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"""Return just those errors associated with security"""
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errors = ErrorDict()
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for f in ["honeypot", "timestamp", "security_hash"]:
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if f in self.errors:
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errors[f] = self.errors[f]
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return errors
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def clean_security_hash(self):
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"""Check the security hash."""
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security_hash_dict = {
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'content_type' : self.data.get("content_type", ""),
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'object_pk' : self.data.get("object_pk", ""),
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'timestamp' : self.data.get("timestamp", ""),
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}
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expected_hash = self.generate_security_hash(**security_hash_dict)
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actual_hash = self.cleaned_data["security_hash"]
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Fixed #14445 - Use HMAC and constant-time comparison functions where needed.
All adhoc MAC applications have been updated to use HMAC, using SHA1 to
generate unique keys for each application based on the SECRET_KEY, which is
common practice for this situation. In all cases, backwards compatibility
with existing hashes has been maintained, aiming to phase this out as per
the normal deprecation process. In this way, under most normal
circumstances the old hashes will have expired (e.g. by session expiration
etc.) before they become invalid.
In the case of the messages framework and the cookie backend, which was
already using HMAC, there is the possibility of a backwards incompatibility
if the SECRET_KEY is shorter than the default 50 bytes, but the low
likelihood and low impact meant compatibility code was not worth it.
All known instances where tokens/hashes were compared using simple string
equality, which could potentially open timing based attacks, have also been
fixed using a constant-time comparison function.
There are no known practical attacks against the existing implementations,
so these security improvements will not be backported.
git-svn-id: http://code.djangoproject.com/svn/django/trunk@14218 bcc190cf-cafb-0310-a4f2-bffc1f526a37
2010-10-15 04:54:30 +08:00
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if not constant_time_compare(expected_hash, actual_hash):
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# Fallback to Django 1.2 method for compatibility
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# PendingDeprecationWarning <- here to remind us to remove this
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# fallback in Django 1.5
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expected_hash_old = self._generate_security_hash_old(**security_hash_dict)
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if not constant_time_compare(expected_hash_old, actual_hash):
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raise forms.ValidationError("Security hash check failed.")
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2009-03-21 21:45:31 +08:00
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return actual_hash
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def clean_timestamp(self):
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"""Make sure the timestamp isn't too far (> 2 hours) in the past."""
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ts = self.cleaned_data["timestamp"]
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if time.time() - ts > (2 * 60 * 60):
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raise forms.ValidationError("Timestamp check failed")
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return ts
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def generate_security_data(self):
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"""Generate a dict of security data for "initial" data."""
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timestamp = int(time.time())
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security_dict = {
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'content_type' : str(self.target_object._meta),
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'object_pk' : str(self.target_object._get_pk_val()),
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'timestamp' : str(timestamp),
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'security_hash' : self.initial_security_hash(timestamp),
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}
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return security_dict
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def initial_security_hash(self, timestamp):
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"""
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Generate the initial security hash from self.content_object
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and a (unix) timestamp.
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"""
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initial_security_dict = {
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'content_type' : str(self.target_object._meta),
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'object_pk' : str(self.target_object._get_pk_val()),
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'timestamp' : str(timestamp),
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}
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return self.generate_security_hash(**initial_security_dict)
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def generate_security_hash(self, content_type, object_pk, timestamp):
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Fixed #14445 - Use HMAC and constant-time comparison functions where needed.
All adhoc MAC applications have been updated to use HMAC, using SHA1 to
generate unique keys for each application based on the SECRET_KEY, which is
common practice for this situation. In all cases, backwards compatibility
with existing hashes has been maintained, aiming to phase this out as per
the normal deprecation process. In this way, under most normal
circumstances the old hashes will have expired (e.g. by session expiration
etc.) before they become invalid.
In the case of the messages framework and the cookie backend, which was
already using HMAC, there is the possibility of a backwards incompatibility
if the SECRET_KEY is shorter than the default 50 bytes, but the low
likelihood and low impact meant compatibility code was not worth it.
All known instances where tokens/hashes were compared using simple string
equality, which could potentially open timing based attacks, have also been
fixed using a constant-time comparison function.
There are no known practical attacks against the existing implementations,
so these security improvements will not be backported.
git-svn-id: http://code.djangoproject.com/svn/django/trunk@14218 bcc190cf-cafb-0310-a4f2-bffc1f526a37
2010-10-15 04:54:30 +08:00
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"""
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Generate a HMAC security hash from the provided info.
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"""
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info = (content_type, object_pk, timestamp)
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key_salt = "django.contrib.forms.CommentSecurityForm"
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value = "-".join(info)
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return salted_hmac(key_salt, value).hexdigest()
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def _generate_security_hash_old(self, content_type, object_pk, timestamp):
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2009-03-21 21:45:31 +08:00
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"""Generate a (SHA1) security hash from the provided info."""
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Fixed #14445 - Use HMAC and constant-time comparison functions where needed.
All adhoc MAC applications have been updated to use HMAC, using SHA1 to
generate unique keys for each application based on the SECRET_KEY, which is
common practice for this situation. In all cases, backwards compatibility
with existing hashes has been maintained, aiming to phase this out as per
the normal deprecation process. In this way, under most normal
circumstances the old hashes will have expired (e.g. by session expiration
etc.) before they become invalid.
In the case of the messages framework and the cookie backend, which was
already using HMAC, there is the possibility of a backwards incompatibility
if the SECRET_KEY is shorter than the default 50 bytes, but the low
likelihood and low impact meant compatibility code was not worth it.
All known instances where tokens/hashes were compared using simple string
equality, which could potentially open timing based attacks, have also been
fixed using a constant-time comparison function.
There are no known practical attacks against the existing implementations,
so these security improvements will not be backported.
git-svn-id: http://code.djangoproject.com/svn/django/trunk@14218 bcc190cf-cafb-0310-a4f2-bffc1f526a37
2010-10-15 04:54:30 +08:00
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# Django 1.2 compatibility
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2009-03-21 21:45:31 +08:00
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info = (content_type, object_pk, timestamp, settings.SECRET_KEY)
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2011-03-28 09:40:43 +08:00
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return hashlib.sha1("".join(info)).hexdigest()
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2009-03-21 21:45:31 +08:00
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class CommentDetailsForm(CommentSecurityForm):
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"""
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Handles the specific details of the comment (name, comment, etc.).
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"""
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name = forms.CharField(label=_("Name"), max_length=50)
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email = forms.EmailField(label=_("Email address"))
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url = forms.URLField(label=_("URL"), required=False)
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comment = forms.CharField(label=_('Comment'), widget=forms.Textarea,
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max_length=COMMENT_MAX_LENGTH)
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2008-08-26 06:14:22 +08:00
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def get_comment_object(self):
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"""
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Return a new (unsaved) comment object based on the information in this
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form. Assumes that the form is already validated and will throw a
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ValueError if not.
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Does not set any of the fields that would come from a Request object
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(i.e. ``user`` or ``ip_address``).
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"""
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if not self.is_valid():
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raise ValueError("get_comment_object may only be called on valid forms")
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2009-12-22 23:18:51 +08:00
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2009-02-24 06:16:00 +08:00
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CommentModel = self.get_comment_model()
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new = CommentModel(**self.get_comment_create_data())
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new = self.check_for_duplicate_comment(new)
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2009-12-22 23:18:51 +08:00
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2009-02-24 06:16:00 +08:00
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return new
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2009-12-22 23:18:51 +08:00
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2009-02-24 06:16:00 +08:00
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def get_comment_model(self):
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"""
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Get the comment model to create with this form. Subclasses in custom
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comment apps should override this, get_comment_create_data, and perhaps
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check_for_duplicate_comment to provide custom comment models.
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"""
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return Comment
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2009-12-22 23:18:51 +08:00
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2009-02-24 06:16:00 +08:00
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def get_comment_create_data(self):
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"""
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Returns the dict of data to be used to create a comment. Subclasses in
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custom comment apps that override get_comment_model can override this
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method to add extra fields onto a custom comment model.
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"""
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return dict(
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2008-08-26 06:14:22 +08:00
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content_type = ContentType.objects.get_for_model(self.target_object),
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2008-09-02 01:23:09 +08:00
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object_pk = force_unicode(self.target_object._get_pk_val()),
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2008-08-26 06:14:22 +08:00
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user_name = self.cleaned_data["name"],
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user_email = self.cleaned_data["email"],
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user_url = self.cleaned_data["url"],
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comment = self.cleaned_data["comment"],
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submit_date = datetime.datetime.now(),
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site_id = settings.SITE_ID,
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is_public = True,
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is_removed = False,
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)
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2009-12-22 23:18:51 +08:00
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2009-02-24 06:16:00 +08:00
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def check_for_duplicate_comment(self, new):
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"""
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Check that a submitted comment isn't a duplicate. This might be caused
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by someone posting a comment twice. If it is a dup, silently return the *previous* comment.
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"""
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2009-12-22 23:18:51 +08:00
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possible_duplicates = self.get_comment_model()._default_manager.using(
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self.target_object._state.db
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).filter(
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2008-08-26 06:14:22 +08:00
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content_type = new.content_type,
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object_pk = new.object_pk,
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user_name = new.user_name,
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user_email = new.user_email,
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user_url = new.user_url,
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)
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for old in possible_duplicates:
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if old.submit_date.date() == new.submit_date.date() and old.comment == new.comment:
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return old
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2009-12-22 23:18:51 +08:00
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2008-08-26 06:14:22 +08:00
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return new
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def clean_comment(self):
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"""
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If COMMENTS_ALLOW_PROFANITIES is False, check that the comment doesn't
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contain anything in PROFANITIES_LIST.
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"""
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comment = self.cleaned_data["comment"]
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if settings.COMMENTS_ALLOW_PROFANITIES == False:
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bad_words = [w for w in settings.PROFANITIES_LIST if w in comment.lower()]
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if bad_words:
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plural = len(bad_words) > 1
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2008-10-05 13:05:32 +08:00
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raise forms.ValidationError(ungettext(
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2008-08-26 06:14:22 +08:00
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"Watch your mouth! The word %s is not allowed here.",
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"Watch your mouth! The words %s are not allowed here.", plural) % \
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get_text_list(['"%s%s%s"' % (i[0], '-'*(len(i)-2), i[-1]) for i in bad_words], 'and'))
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return comment
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2009-03-21 21:45:31 +08:00
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class CommentForm(CommentDetailsForm):
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honeypot = forms.CharField(required=False,
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label=_('If you enter anything in this field '\
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'your comment will be treated as spam'))
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2008-08-26 06:14:22 +08:00
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2009-03-21 21:45:31 +08:00
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def clean_honeypot(self):
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"""Check that nothing's been entered into the honeypot."""
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value = self.cleaned_data["honeypot"]
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if value:
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raise forms.ValidationError(self.fields["honeypot"].label)
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return value
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