Thanks Curtis Malony and Florian Apolloner.
Squashed commit of the following:
commit 3380495e93
Author: Aymeric Augustin <aymeric.augustin@m4x.org>
Date: Sat Nov 23 14:18:07 2013 +0100
Looked up the template_fragments cache at runtime.
commit 905a74f52b
Author: Aymeric Augustin <aymeric.augustin@m4x.org>
Date: Sat Nov 23 14:19:48 2013 +0100
Removed all uses of create_cache.
Refactored the cache tests significantly.
Made it safe to override the CACHES setting.
commit 35e289fe92
Author: Aymeric Augustin <aymeric.augustin@m4x.org>
Date: Sat Nov 23 12:23:57 2013 +0100
Removed create_cache function.
commit 8e274f747a
Author: Aymeric Augustin <aymeric.augustin@m4x.org>
Date: Sat Nov 23 12:04:52 2013 +0100
Updated docs to describe a simplified cache backend API.
commit ee7eb0f73e
Author: Curtis Maloney <curtis@tinbrain.net>
Date: Sat Oct 19 09:49:24 2013 +1100
Fixed#21012 -- Thread-local caches, like databases.
Added settings.SESSION_SERIALIZER which is the import path of a serializer
to use for sessions.
Thanks apollo13, carljm, shaib, akaariai, charettes, and dstufft for reviews.
SuspiciousOperations have been differentiated into subclasses, and
are now logged to a 'django.security.*' logger. SuspiciousOperations
that reach django.core.handlers.base.BaseHandler will now return a 400
instead of a 500.
Thanks to tiwoc for the report, and Carl Meyer and Donald Stufft
for review.
* Prevented stale session files from being loaded
* Added removal of stale session files in django-admin.py clearsessions
Thanks ej for the report, crodjer and Elvard for their inputs.
These tests are expected to fail for the file session backend because it
doesn't handle expiry properly. They didn't because of an error in the
test setup sequence.
Refs #19200, #18194.
This change allows for cleaner tests: we can test the exact output.
Refs #18194: this change makes it possible to compute session expiry
dates at times other than when the session is saved.
Fixed#18458: the existence of the `modification` kwarg implies that you
must pass it to get_expiry_age/date if you call these functions outside
of a short request - response cycle (the intended use case).
Some backends issue a warning here, others not. This is not the primary
goal of the test, so the assertion about the warning has been removed.
Thanks Carl Meyer for noticing the issue and suggesting the fix.
Saving session data is somewhat likely to lead into error when the
status code is 500. It is guaranteed to lead into error if the reason
for the 500 code is query error on PostgreSQL.
Catches memcached session key errors related to overly long session keys.
This is a long-standing bug, but severity was exacerbated by the addition
of cookie-backed session storage, which generates long session values. If
an installation switched from cookie-backed session store to memcached,
users would not be able to log in because of the server error from overly
long memcached keys.
git-svn-id: http://code.djangoproject.com/svn/django/trunk@17795 bcc190cf-cafb-0310-a4f2-bffc1f526a37
This also removes the implicit initialization of the session key on the first access in favor of explicit initialization.
git-svn-id: http://code.djangoproject.com/svn/django/trunk@17155 bcc190cf-cafb-0310-a4f2-bffc1f526a37
All adhoc MAC applications have been updated to use HMAC, using SHA1 to
generate unique keys for each application based on the SECRET_KEY, which is
common practice for this situation. In all cases, backwards compatibility
with existing hashes has been maintained, aiming to phase this out as per
the normal deprecation process. In this way, under most normal
circumstances the old hashes will have expired (e.g. by session expiration
etc.) before they become invalid.
In the case of the messages framework and the cookie backend, which was
already using HMAC, there is the possibility of a backwards incompatibility
if the SECRET_KEY is shorter than the default 50 bytes, but the low
likelihood and low impact meant compatibility code was not worth it.
All known instances where tokens/hashes were compared using simple string
equality, which could potentially open timing based attacks, have also been
fixed using a constant-time comparison function.
There are no known practical attacks against the existing implementations,
so these security improvements will not be backported.
git-svn-id: http://code.djangoproject.com/svn/django/trunk@14218 bcc190cf-cafb-0310-a4f2-bffc1f526a37
Christopher Medrela
Curtis Maloney
coagulant
Alasdair Nicol
Alex Gaynor
CHI Cheng
Tim Graham
Aymeric Augustin
Preston Holmes
Erik Romijn
Mathijs de Bruin
Claude Paroz
Malcolm Tredinnick
Carl Meyer
Anssi Kääriäinen
Paul McMillan
Adrian Holovaty
Jannis Leidel
Luke Plant
Russell Keith-Magee