Thanks to Preston Timmons for the bulk of the work on the patch, especially
updating Django's own test suite to comply with the requirements of the new
runner. Thanks also to Jannis Leidel and Mahdi Yusuf for earlier work on the
patch and the discovery runner.
Refs #11077, #17032, and #18670.
This applies to both our own [test] code and documentation examples. Also:
* Moved the functions and handlers from `django.conf.urls.defaults` up to
`django.conf.urls` deprecating the former module.
* Added documentation for `handler403`.
* Tweaked the URLs topic document a bit.
Thanks to pupeno and cdestigter for their great work contributing patches.
git-svn-id: http://code.djangoproject.com/svn/django/trunk@16818 bcc190cf-cafb-0310-a4f2-bffc1f526a37
This ought to have been done in [14218], but although the FormPreview class
was modified, and some tests were added, the crucial lines of code were not
changed (the 'FormPreview.security_hash' method), and tests for the new
behaviour were not added. So it is being changed now. Unlike some of the
other code in that changeset, this does not need to have a compatibility
fallback to cope with existing hashes, because the consequence of a failed
hash is minimal - the user is re-presented with the preview stage of the
form, which will then have a correct hash.
git-svn-id: http://code.djangoproject.com/svn/django/trunk@15952 bcc190cf-cafb-0310-a4f2-bffc1f526a37
All adhoc MAC applications have been updated to use HMAC, using SHA1 to
generate unique keys for each application based on the SECRET_KEY, which is
common practice for this situation. In all cases, backwards compatibility
with existing hashes has been maintained, aiming to phase this out as per
the normal deprecation process. In this way, under most normal
circumstances the old hashes will have expired (e.g. by session expiration
etc.) before they become invalid.
In the case of the messages framework and the cookie backend, which was
already using HMAC, there is the possibility of a backwards incompatibility
if the SECRET_KEY is shorter than the default 50 bytes, but the low
likelihood and low impact meant compatibility code was not worth it.
All known instances where tokens/hashes were compared using simple string
equality, which could potentially open timing based attacks, have also been
fixed using a constant-time comparison function.
There are no known practical attacks against the existing implementations,
so these security improvements will not be backported.
git-svn-id: http://code.djangoproject.com/svn/django/trunk@14218 bcc190cf-cafb-0310-a4f2-bffc1f526a37
Carl Meyer
Aymeric Augustin
Alex Gaynor
Ramiro Morales
Jannis Leidel
Luke Plant