django1/django/contrib/auth/tokens.py

118 lines
4.5 KiB
Python

from datetime import datetime, time
from django.conf import settings
from django.utils.crypto import constant_time_compare, salted_hmac
from django.utils.http import base36_to_int, int_to_base36
class PasswordResetTokenGenerator:
"""
Strategy object used to generate and check tokens for the password
reset mechanism.
"""
key_salt = "django.contrib.auth.tokens.PasswordResetTokenGenerator"
algorithm = None
secret = None
def __init__(self):
self.secret = self.secret or settings.SECRET_KEY
# RemovedInDjango40Warning: when the deprecation ends, replace with:
# self.algorithm = self.algorithm or 'sha256'
self.algorithm = self.algorithm or settings.DEFAULT_HASHING_ALGORITHM
def make_token(self, user):
"""
Return a token that can be used once to do a password reset
for the given user.
"""
return self._make_token_with_timestamp(user, self._num_seconds(self._now()))
def check_token(self, user, token):
"""
Check that a password reset token is correct for a given user.
"""
if not (user and token):
return False
# Parse the token
try:
ts_b36, _ = token.split("-")
# RemovedInDjango40Warning.
legacy_token = len(ts_b36) < 4
except ValueError:
return False
try:
ts = base36_to_int(ts_b36)
except ValueError:
return False
# Check that the timestamp/uid has not been tampered with
if not constant_time_compare(self._make_token_with_timestamp(user, ts), token):
# RemovedInDjango40Warning: when the deprecation ends, replace
# with:
# return False
if not constant_time_compare(
self._make_token_with_timestamp(user, ts, legacy=True),
token,
):
return False
# RemovedInDjango40Warning: convert days to seconds and round to
# midnight (server time) for pre-Django 3.1 tokens.
now = self._now()
if legacy_token:
ts *= 24 * 60 * 60
ts += int((now - datetime.combine(now.date(), time.min)).total_seconds())
# Check the timestamp is within limit.
if (self._num_seconds(now) - ts) > settings.PASSWORD_RESET_TIMEOUT:
return False
return True
def _make_token_with_timestamp(self, user, timestamp, legacy=False):
# timestamp is number of seconds since 2001-1-1. Converted to base 36,
# this gives us a 6 digit string until about 2069.
ts_b36 = int_to_base36(timestamp)
hash_string = salted_hmac(
self.key_salt,
self._make_hash_value(user, timestamp),
secret=self.secret,
# RemovedInDjango40Warning: when the deprecation ends, remove the
# legacy argument and replace with:
# algorithm=self.algorithm,
algorithm='sha1' if legacy else self.algorithm,
).hexdigest()[::2] # Limit to shorten the URL.
return "%s-%s" % (ts_b36, hash_string)
def _make_hash_value(self, user, timestamp):
"""
Hash the user's primary key, email (if available), and some user state
that's sure to change after a password reset to produce a token that is
invalidated when it's used:
1. The password field will change upon a password reset (even if the
same password is chosen, due to password salting).
2. The last_login field will usually be updated very shortly after
a password reset.
Failing those things, settings.PASSWORD_RESET_TIMEOUT eventually
invalidates the token.
Running this data through salted_hmac() prevents password cracking
attempts using the reset token, provided the secret isn't compromised.
"""
# Truncate microseconds so that tokens are consistent even if the
# database doesn't support microseconds.
login_timestamp = '' if user.last_login is None else user.last_login.replace(microsecond=0, tzinfo=None)
email_field = user.get_email_field_name()
email = getattr(user, email_field, '') or ''
return f'{user.pk}{user.password}{login_timestamp}{timestamp}{email}'
def _num_seconds(self, dt):
return int((dt - datetime(2001, 1, 1)).total_seconds())
def _now(self):
# Used for mocking in tests
return datetime.now()
default_token_generator = PasswordResetTokenGenerator()