Making them the same type is simply confusing, but also means that you
could accidentally use one in the wrong context. This eliminates that
problem. This also includes a whole bunch of cleanups for the types
within DeviceRule, so that they can be used more ergonomically.
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
These lists have been in the codebase for a very long time, and have
been unused for a large portion of that time -- specconv doesn't
generate them and the only user of these flags has been tests (which
doesn't inspire much confidence).
In addition, we had an incorrect implementation of a white-list policy.
This wasn't exploitable because all of our users explicitly specify
"deny all" as the first rule, but it was a pretty glaring issue that
came from the "feature" that users can select whether they prefer a
white- or black- list. Fix this by always writing a deny-all rule (which
is what our users were doing anyway, to work around this bug).
This is one of many changes needed to clean up the devices cgroup code.
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
The error message was including both the rootfs path, and the full
mount path, which also includes the path of the rootfs.
This patch removes the rootfs path from the error message, as it
was redundant, and made the error message overly verbose
Before this patch (errors wrapped for readability):
```
container_linux.go:348: starting container process caused: process_linux.go:438:
container init caused: rootfs_linux.go:58: mounting "/foo.txt"
to rootfs "/var/lib/docker/overlay2/de506d67da606b807009e23b548fec60d72359c77eec88785d8c7ecd54a6e4b2/merged"
at "/var/lib/docker/overlay2/de506d67da606b807009e23b548fec60d72359c77eec88785d8c7ecd54a6e4b2/merged/usr/share/nginx/html"
caused: not a directory: unknown
```
With this patch applied:
```
container_linux.go:348: starting container process caused: process_linux.go:438:
container init caused: rootfs_linux.go:58: mounting "/foo.txt"
to rootfs at "/var/lib/docker/overlay2/de506d67da606b807009e23b548fec60d72359c77eec88785d8c7ecd54a6e4b2/merged/usr/share/nginx/html"
caused: not a directory: unknown
```
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
To make a bind mount read-only, it needs to be remounted. This is what
the code removed does, but it is not needed here.
We have to deal with three cases here:
1. cgroup v2 unified mode. In this case the mount is real mount with
fstype=cgroup2, and there is no need to have a bind mount on top,
as we pass readonly flag to the mount as is.
2. cgroup v1 + cgroupns (enableCgroupns == true). In this case the
"mount" is in fact a set of real mounts with fstype=cgroup, and
they are all performed in mountCgroupV1, with readonly flag
added if needed.
3. cgroup v1 as is (enableCgroupns == false). In this case
mountCgroupV1() calls mountToRootfs() again with an argument
from the list obtained from getCgroupMounts(), i.e. a bind
mount with the same flags as the original mount has (plus
unix.MS_BIND | unix.MS_REC), and mountToRootfs() does remounting
(under the case "bind":).
So, the code which this patch is removing is not needed -- it
essentially does nothing in case 3 above (since the bind mount
is already remounted readonly), and in cases 1 and 2 it
creates an unneeded extra bind mount on top of a real one (or set of
real ones).
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
In case of cgroupv2 unified hierarchy, the /sys/fs/cgroup mount
is the real mount with fstype of cgroup2 (rather than a set of
external bind mounts like for cgroupv1).
So, we should not add it to the list of "external bind mounts"
on both checkpoint and restore.
Without this fix, checkpoint integration tests fail on cgroup v2.
Also, same is true for cgroup v1 + cgroupns.
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
1. rootfs is already validated to be kosher by (*ConfigValidator).rootfs()
2. mount points from /proc/self/mountinfo are absolute and clean, too
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
Delete libcontainer/mount in favor of github.com/moby/sys/mountinfo,
which is fast mountinfo parser.
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
mount(2) will blindly follow symlinks, which is a problem because it
allows a malicious container to trick runc into mounting /proc to an
entirely different location (and thus within the attacker's control for
a rename-exchange attack).
This is just a hotfix (to "stop the bleeding"), and the more complete
fix would be finish libpathrs and port runc to it (to avoid these types
of attacks entirely, and defend against a variety of other /proc-related
attacks). It can be bypased by someone having "/" be a volume controlled
by another container.
Fixes: CVE-2019-19921
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
Bind-mount /sys/fs/cgroup when we are in UserNS but CgroupNS is not unshared,
because we cannot mount cgroup2.
This behavior correspond to crun v0.10.2.
Fix#2158
Signed-off-by: Akihiro Suda <akihiro.suda.cz@hco.ntt.co.jp>
Fixes#2128
This allows proc to be bind mounted for host and rootless namespace usecases but
it removes the ability to mount over the top of proc with a directory.
```bash
> sudo docker run --rm apparmor
docker: Error response from daemon: OCI runtime create failed:
container_linux.go:346: starting container process caused "process_linux.go:449:
container init caused \"rootfs_linux.go:58: mounting
\\\"/var/lib/docker/volumes/aae28ea068c33d60e64d1a75916cf3ec2dc3634f97571854c9ed30c8401460c1/_data\\\"
to rootfs
\\\"/var/lib/docker/overlay2/a6be5ae911bf19f8eecb23a295dec85be9a8ee8da66e9fb55b47c841d1e381b7/merged\\\"
at \\\"/proc\\\" caused
\\\"\\\\\\\"/var/lib/docker/overlay2/a6be5ae911bf19f8eecb23a295dec85be9a8ee8da66e9fb55b47c841d1e381b7/merged/proc\\\\\\\"
cannot be mounted because it is not of type proc\\\"\"": unknown.
> sudo docker run --rm -v /proc:/proc apparmor
docker-default (enforce) root 18989 0.9 0.0 1288 4 ?
Ss 16:47 0:00 sleep 20
```
Signed-off-by: Michael Crosby <crosbymichael@gmail.com>
During rootfs setup all mountpoints (directory and files) are created
before bind mounting the bind mounts. This does not happen during
container restore via CRIU. If restoring in an identical but newly created
rootfs, the restore fails right now. This just factors out the code to
create the bind mount mountpoints so that it also can be used during
restore.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Reber <areber@redhat.com>
When creating a new user namespace, the kernel doesn't allow to mount
a new procfs or sysfs file system if there is not already one instance
fully visible in the current mount namespace.
When using --no-pivot we were effectively inhibiting this protection
from the kernel, as /proc and /sys from the host are still present in
the container mount namespace.
A container without full access to /proc could then create a new user
namespace, and from there able to mount a fully visible /proc, bypassing
the limitations in the container.
A simple reproducer for this issue is:
unshare -mrfp sh -c "mount -t proc none /proc && echo c > /proc/sysrq-trigger"
Signed-off-by: Giuseppe Scrivano <gscrivan@redhat.com>
Cgroup namespace can be configured in `config.json` as other
namespaces. Here is an example:
```
"namespaces": [
{
"type": "pid"
},
{
"type": "network"
},
{
"type": "ipc"
},
{
"type": "uts"
},
{
"type": "mount"
},
{
"type": "cgroup"
}
],
```
Note that if you want to run a container which has shared cgroup ns with
another container, then it's strongly recommended that you set
proper `CgroupsPath` of both containers(the second container's cgroup
path must be the subdirectory of the first one). Or there might be
some unexpected results.
Signed-off-by: Yuanhong Peng <pengyuanhong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Crosby <crosbymichael@gmail.com>
it is now allowed to bind mount /proc. This is useful for rootless
containers when the PID namespace is shared with the host.
Signed-off-by: Giuseppe Scrivano <gscrivan@redhat.com>
MOVE_MOUNT will fail under certain situations.
You are not allowed to MS_MOVE if the parent directory is shared.
man mount
...
The move operation
Move a mounted tree to another place (atomically). The call is:
mount --move olddir newdir
This will cause the contents which previously appeared under olddir to
now be accessible under newdir. The physical location of the files is
not changed. Note that olddir has to be a mountpoint.
Note also that moving a mount residing under a shared mount is invalid
and unsupported. Use findmnt -o TARGET,PROPAGATION to see the current
propagation flags.
Signed-off-by: Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
Currently if a confined container process tries to list these directories
AVC's are generated because they are labeled with external labels. Adding
the mountlabel will remove these AVC's.
Signed-off-by: Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
runc shouldn't depend on docker and be more self-contained.
Removing github.com/pkg/symlink dep is the first step to not depend on docker anymore
Signed-off-by: Vincent Demeester <vincent@sbr.pm>
The benefit for doing this within runc is that it works well with
userns.
Actually, runc already does the same thing for mount points.
Signed-off-by: Akihiro Suda <suda.akihiro@lab.ntt.co.jp>
The documentation here:
https://docs.docker.com/engine/security/userns-remap/#user-namespace-known-limitations
says that readonly containers can't be used with user namespaces do to some
kernel restriction. In fact, there is a special case in the kernel to be
able to do stuff like this, so let's use it.
This takes us from:
ubuntu@docker:~$ docker run -it --read-only ubuntu
docker: Error response from daemon: oci runtime error: container_linux.go:262: starting container process caused "process_linux.go:339: container init caused \"rootfs_linux.go:125: remounting \\\"/dev\\\" as readonly caused \\\"operation not permitted\\\"\"".
to:
ubuntu@docker:~$ docker-runc --version
runc version 1.0.0-rc4+dev
commit: ae2948042b08ad3d6d13cd09f40a50ffff4fc688-dirty
spec: 1.0.0
ubuntu@docker:~$ docker run -it --read-only ubuntu
root@181e2acb909a:/# touch foo
touch: cannot touch 'foo': Read-only file system
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@docker.com>
Using MS_PRIVATE meant that there was a race between the mount(2) and
the umount2(2) calls where runc inadvertently has a live reference to a
mountpoint that existed on the host (which the host cannot kill
implicitly through an unmount and peer sharing).
In particular, this means that if we have a devicemapper mountpoint and
the host is trying to delete the underlying device, the delete will fail
because it is "in use" during the race. While the race is _very_ small
(and libdm actually retries to avoid these sorts of cases) this appears
to manifest in various cases.
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
Since syscall is outdated and broken for some architectures,
use x/sys/unix instead.
There are still some dependencies on the syscall package that will
remain in syscall for the forseeable future:
Errno
Signal
SysProcAttr
Additionally:
- os still uses syscall, so it needs to be kept for anything
returning *os.ProcessState, such as process.Wait.
Signed-off-by: Christy Perez <christy@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
The rootless cgroup manager acts as a noop for all set and apply
operations. It is just used for rootless setups. Currently this is far
too simple (we need to add opportunistic cgroup management), but is good
enough as a first-pass at a noop cgroup manager.
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
As the runtime-spec allows it, we want to be able to specify overlayfs
mounts with:
{
"destination": "/etc/pki",
"type": "overlay",
"source": "overlay",
"options": [
"lowerdir=/etc/pki:/home/amurdaca/go/src/github.com/opencontainers/runc/rootfs_fedora/etc/pki"
]
},
This patch takes care of allowing overlayfs mounts. Both RO and RW
should be supported.
Signed-off-by: Antonio Murdaca <runcom@redhat.com>
On some systems, when we mount some cgroup subsystems into
a same mountpoint, the name sequence of mount options and
cgroup directory name can not be the same.
For example, the mount option is cpuacct,cpu, but
mountpoint name is /sys/fs/cgroup/cpu,cpuacct. In current
runc, we set mount destination name from combining
subsystems, which comes from mount option from
/proc/self/mountinfo, so in my case the name would be
/sys/fs/cgroup/cpuacct,cpu, which is differernt from
host, and will break some applications.
Fix it by using directory name from host mountpoint.
Signed-off-by: Qiang Huang <h.huangqiang@huawei.com>
A remount of a mount point must include all the current flags or
these will be cleared:
```
The mountflags and data arguments should match the values used in the
original mount() call, except for those parameters that are being
deliberately changed.
```
The current code does not do this; the bug manifests in the specified
flags for `/dev` being lost on remount read only at present. As we
need to specify flags, split the code path for this from remounting
paths which are not mount points, as these can only inherit the
existing flags of the path, and these cannot be changed.
In the bind case, remove extra flags from the bind remount. A bind
mount can only be remounted read only, no other flags can be set,
all other flags are inherited from the parent. From the man page:
```
Since Linux 2.6.26, this flag can also be used to make an existing
bind mount read-only by specifying mountflags as:
MS_REMOUNT | MS_BIND | MS_RDONLY
Note that only the MS_RDONLY setting of the bind mount can be changed
in this manner.
```
MS_REC can only be set on the original bind, so move this. See note
in man page on bind mounts:
```
The remaining bits in the mountflags argument are also ignored, with
the exception of MS_REC.
```
Signed-off-by: Justin Cormack <justin.cormack@docker.com>
This implements {createTTY, detach} and all of the combinations and
negations of the two that were previously implemented. There are some
valid questions about out-of-OCI-scope topics like !createTTY and how
things should be handled (why do we dup the current stdio to the
process, and how is that not a security issue). However, these will be
dealt with in a separate patchset.
In order to allow for late console setup, split setupRootfs into the
"preparation" section where all of the mounts are created and the
"finalize" section where we pivot_root and set things as ro. In between
the two we can set up all of the console mountpoints and symlinks we
need.
We use two-stage synchronisation to ensures that when the syscalls are
reordered in a suboptimal way, an out-of-place read() on the parentPipe
will not gobble the ancilliary information.
This patch is part of the console rewrite patchset.
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
I use the same tool (https://github.com/client9/misspell)
as Daniel used a few days ago, don't why he missed these
typos at that time.
Signed-off-by: Qiang Huang <h.huangqiang@huawei.com>
This reverts part of the commit eb0a144b5e
That commit introduced two issues.
- We need to make parent mount of rootfs private before bind mounting
rootfs. Otherwise bind mounting root can propagate in other mount
namespaces. (If parent mount is shared).
- It broke test TestRootfsPropagationSharedMount() on Fedora.
On fedora /tmp is a mount point with "shared" propagation. I think
you should be able to reproduce it on other distributions as well
as long as you mount tmpfs on /tmp and make it "shared" propagation.
Reason for failure is that pivot_root() fails. And it fails because
kernel does following check.
IS_MNT_SHARED(new_mnt->mnt_parent)
Say /tmp/foo is new rootfs, we have bind mounted rootfs, so new_mnt
is /tmp/foo, and new_mnt->mnt_parent is /tmp which is "shared" on
fedora and above check fails.
So this change broke few things, it is a good idea to revert part of it.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Namely, use an undocumented feature of pivot_root(2) where
pivot_root(".", ".") is actually a feature and allows you to make the
old_root be tied to your /proc/self/cwd in a way that makes unmounting
easy. Thanks a lot to the LXC developers which came up with this idea
first.
This is the first step of many to allowing runC to work with a
completely read-only rootfs.
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
If copyup is specified for a tmpfs mount, then the contents of the
underlying directory are copied into the tmpfs mounted over it.
Signed-off-by: Mrunal Patel <mrunalp@gmail.com>
Aleksa Sarai
Sebastiaan van Stijn
Kir Kolyshkin
Akihiro Suda
Michael Crosby
Giuseppe Scrivano
Adrian Reber
Mrunal Patel
Yuanhong Peng
Dominik Süß
ChangFeng
Daniel J Walsh
Mrunal Patel
Bin Chen
Vincent Demeester
Akihiro Suda
Tycho Andersen
Christy Perez
Qiang Huang
Daniel, Dao Quang Minh
Ma Shimiao
Antonio Murdaca
Justin Cormack
Vivek Goyal
Alexander Morozov