The gocapability package uses /proc/PID/status to get a bounding set.
If a container uses pidns without mntns, it sees /proc from the host
namespace, but the process doesn't know its own pid in this namespace.
In this case it can use /proc/self/status, which is always the right one.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
'namespaces' need to refactored a bit more to move the API part of it to 'libcontainer' package and keep the namespace specific code inside that package.
This change is not expected to break docker.
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Vishnu Kannan <vishnuk@google.com> (github: vishh)
Handle the error when remounting certain files and paths as readonly if
they do not exist.
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Michael Crosby <michael@docker.com> (github: crosbymichael)
It is no longer necessary to pass "SETUID" or "SETGID" capabilities to
the container when a "user" is specified in the config.
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Bernerd Schaefer <bj.schaefer@gmail.com> (github: bernerdschaefer)
Some applications want to write to /proc. For instance:
docker run -it centos groupadd foo
Gives: groupadd: failure while writing changes to /etc/group
And strace reveals why:
open("/proc/self/task/13/attr/fscreate", O_RDWR) = -1 EROFS (Read-only file system)
I've looked at what other systems do, and systemd-nspawn makes /proc read-write
and /proc/sys readonly, while lxc allows "proc:mixed" which does the same,
plus it makes /proc/sysrq-trigger also readonly.
The later seems like a prudent idea, so we follows lxc proc:mixed.
Additionally we make /proc/irq and /proc/bus, as these seem to let
you control various hardware things.
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Alexander Larsson <alexl@redhat.com> (github: alexlarsson)
those that were specified in the config. This commit also explicitly
adds a set of capabilities that we were silently not dropping and were
assumed by the tests.
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Victor Marmol <vmarmol@google.com> (github: vmarmol)
We don't have the flexibility to do extra things with lxc because it is
a black box and most fo the magic happens before we get a chance to
interact with it in dockerinit.
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Michael Crosby <michael@crosbymichael.com> (github: crosbymichael)
There is not need for the remount hack, we use aa_change_onexec so the
apparmor profile is not applied until we exec the users app.
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Michael Crosby <michael@crosbymichael.com> (github: crosbymichael)
This also cleans up some of the left over restriction paths code from
before.
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Michael Crosby <michael@crosbymichael.com> (github: crosbymichael)
It has been pointed out that some files in /proc and /sys can be used
to break out of containers. However, if those filesystems are mounted
read-only, most of the known exploits are mitigated, since they rely
on writing some file in those filesystems.
This does not replace security modules (like SELinux or AppArmor), it
is just another layer of security. Likewise, it doesn't mean that the
other mitigations (shadowing parts of /proc or /sys with bind mounts)
are useless. Those measures are still useful. As such, the shadowing
of /proc/kcore is still enabled with both LXC and native drivers.
Special care has to be taken with /proc/1/attr, which still needs to
be mounted read-write in order to enable the AppArmor profile. It is
bind-mounted from a private read-write mount of procfs.
All that enforcement is done in dockerinit. The code doing the real
work is in libcontainer. The init function for the LXC driver calls
the function from libcontainer to avoid code duplication.
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Jérôme Petazzoni <jerome@docker.com> (github: jpetazzo)
Andrey Vagin
Michael Crosby
Victor Vieux
Lee Treveil
Vishnu Kannan
Michael Crosby
Bernerd Schaefer
Alexander Larsson
Victor Marmol
Tianon Gravi
Jérôme Petazzoni