Add specific types for Required and Optional DeviceNodes
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Michael Crosby <michael@crosbymichael.com> (github: crosbymichael)
Without this any container startup fails:
2014/05/20 09:20:36 setup mount namespace copy additional dev nodes mknod fuse operation not permitted
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Alexander Larsson <alexl@redhat.com> (github: alexlarsson)
Fixes#5849
If the host system does not have fuse enabled in the kernel config we
will ignore the is not exist errors when trying to copy the device node
from the host system into the container.
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Michael Crosby <michael@crosbymichael.com> (github: crosbymichael)
Some applications want to write to /proc. For instance:
docker run -it centos groupadd foo
Gives: groupadd: failure while writing changes to /etc/group
And strace reveals why:
open("/proc/self/task/13/attr/fscreate", O_RDWR) = -1 EROFS (Read-only file system)
I've looked at what other systems do, and systemd-nspawn makes /proc read-write
and /proc/sys readonly, while lxc allows "proc:mixed" which does the same,
plus it makes /proc/sysrq-trigger also readonly.
The later seems like a prudent idea, so we follows lxc proc:mixed.
Additionally we make /proc/irq and /proc/bus, as these seem to let
you control various hardware things.
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Alexander Larsson <alexl@redhat.com> (github: alexlarsson)
those that were specified in the config. This commit also explicitly
adds a set of capabilities that we were silently not dropping and were
assumed by the tests.
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Victor Marmol <vmarmol@google.com> (github: vmarmol)
We don't need this because it is covered by the libcontainer MAINTAINERS
file
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Michael Crosby <michael@crosbymichael.com> (github: crosbymichael)
After copying allowed device nodes, set up "/dev/fd", "/dev/stdin",
"/dev/stdout", and "/dev/stderr" symlinks.
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Bernerd Schaefer <bj.schaefer@gmail.com> (github: bernerdschaefer)
[rebased by @crosbymichael]
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Michael Crosby <michael@crosbymichael.com> (github: crosbymichael)
Before we create any files to bind-mount on, make sure they are
inside the container rootfs, handling for instance absolute symbolic
links inside the container.
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Alexander Larsson <alexl@redhat.com> (github: alexlarsson)
All modern distros set up /run to be a tmpfs, see for instance:
https://wiki.debian.org/ReleaseGoals/RunDirectory
Its a very useful place to store pid-files, sockets and other things
that only live at runtime and that should not be stored in the image.
This is also useful when running systemd inside a container, as it
will try to mount /run if not already mounted, which will fail for
non-privileged container.
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Alexander Larsson <alexl@redhat.com> (github: alexlarsson)
If you specify a bind mount in a place that doesn't have a file yet we
create that (and parent directories). This is needed because otherwise
you can't use volumes like e.g. /dev/log, as that gets covered by the
/dev tmpfs mounts.
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Alexander Larsson <alexl@redhat.com> (github: alexlarsson)
We don't have the flexibility to do extra things with lxc because it is
a black box and most fo the magic happens before we get a chance to
interact with it in dockerinit.
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Michael Crosby <michael@crosbymichael.com> (github: crosbymichael)
There is not need for the remount hack, we use aa_change_onexec so the
apparmor profile is not applied until we exec the users app.
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Michael Crosby <michael@crosbymichael.com> (github: crosbymichael)
This also cleans up some of the left over restriction paths code from
before.
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Michael Crosby <michael@crosbymichael.com> (github: crosbymichael)
It has been pointed out that some files in /proc and /sys can be used
to break out of containers. However, if those filesystems are mounted
read-only, most of the known exploits are mitigated, since they rely
on writing some file in those filesystems.
This does not replace security modules (like SELinux or AppArmor), it
is just another layer of security. Likewise, it doesn't mean that the
other mitigations (shadowing parts of /proc or /sys with bind mounts)
are useless. Those measures are still useful. As such, the shadowing
of /proc/kcore is still enabled with both LXC and native drivers.
Special care has to be taken with /proc/1/attr, which still needs to
be mounted read-write in order to enable the AppArmor profile. It is
bind-mounted from a private read-write mount of procfs.
All that enforcement is done in dockerinit. The code doing the real
work is in libcontainer. The init function for the LXC driver calls
the function from libcontainer to avoid code duplication.
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Jérôme Petazzoni <jerome@docker.com> (github: jpetazzo)
Kernel capabilities for privileged syslog operations are currently splitted into
CAP_SYS_ADMIN and CAP_SYSLOG since the following commit:
http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=ce6ada35bdf710d16582cc4869c26722547e6f11
This patch drops CAP_SYSLOG to prevent containers from messing with
host's syslog (e.g. `dmesg -c` clears up host's printk ring buffer).
Closes#5491
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Eiichi Tsukata <devel@etsukata.com> (github: Etsukata)
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Michael Crosby <michael@crosbymichael.com> (github: crosbymichael)
No need to duplicate this information when we already have a
container.json file in the root of libcontainer
Docker-DCO-1.1-Signed-off-by: Michael Crosby <michael@crosbymichael.com> (github: crosbymichael)
Tianon Gravi
Michael Crosby
Alexander Larsson
Victor Marmol
Victor Vieux
Michael Crosby
Sridhar Ratnakumar
Bernerd Schaefer
Victor Vieux
Guillaume J. Charmes
Vishnu Kannan
Rohit Jnagal
Guillaume J. Charmes
Jérôme Petazzoni
Eiichi Tsukata