Some systemd properties are documented as having "Sec" suffix
(e.g. "TimeoutStopSec") but are expected to have "USec" suffix
when passed over dbus, so let's provide appropriate conversion
to improve compatibility.
This means, one can specify TimeoutStopSec with a numeric argument,
in seconds, and it will be properly converted to TimeoutStopUsec
with the argument in microseconds. As a side bonus, even float
values are converted, so e.g. TimeoutStopSec=1.5 is possible.
This turned out a bit more tricky to implement when I was
originally expected, since there are a handful of numeric
types in dbus and each one requires explicit conversion.
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
In case systemd is used to set cgroups for the container,
it creates a scope unit dedicated to it (usually named
`runc-$ID.scope`).
This patch adds an ability to set arbitrary systemd properties
for the systemd unit via runtime spec annotations.
Initially this was developed as an ability to specify the
`TimeoutStopUSec` property, but later generalized to work with
arbitrary ones.
Example usage: add the following to runtime spec (config.json):
```
"annotations": {
"org.systemd.property.TimeoutStopUSec": "uint64 123456789",
"org.systemd.property.CollectMode":"'inactive-or-failed'"
},
```
and start the container (e.g. `runc --systemd-cgroup run $ID`).
The above will set the following systemd parameters:
* `TimeoutStopSec` to 2 minutes and 3 seconds,
* `CollectMode` to "inactive-or-failed".
The values are in the gvariant format (see [1]). To figure out
which type systemd expects for a particular parameter, see
systemd sources.
In particular, parameters with `USec` suffix require an `uint64`
typed argument, while gvariant assumes int32 for a numeric values,
therefore the explicit type is required.
NOTE that systemd receives the time-typed parameters as *USec
but shows them (in `systemctl show`) as *Sec. For example,
the stop timeout should be set as `TimeoutStopUSec` but
is shown as `TimeoutStopSec`.
[1] https://developer.gnome.org/glib/stable/gvariant-text.html
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
mount(2) will blindly follow symlinks, which is a problem because it
allows a malicious container to trick runc into mounting /proc to an
entirely different location (and thus within the attacker's control for
a rename-exchange attack).
This is just a hotfix (to "stop the bleeding"), and the more complete
fix would be finish libpathrs and port runc to it (to avoid these types
of attacks entirely, and defend against a variety of other /proc-related
attacks). It can be bypased by someone having "/" be a volume controlled
by another container.
Fixes: CVE-2019-19921
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
A new method was added to the cgroup interface when #2177 was merged.
After #2177 got merged, #2169 was merged without rebase (sorry!) and compilation was failing:
libcontainer/cgroups/fs2/fs2.go:208:22: container.Cgroup undefined (type *configs.Config has no field or method Cgroup)
Signed-off-by: Akihiro Suda <akihiro.suda.cz@hco.ntt.co.jp>
`configs.Cgroup` contains the configuration used to create cgroups. This
configuration must be saved to disk, since it's required to restore the
cgroup manager that was used to create the cgroups.
Add method to get cgroup configuration from cgroup Manager to allow API users
save it to disk and restore a cgroup manager later.
fixes#2176
Signed-off-by: Julio Montes <julio.montes@intel.com>
A `config.Cgroups` object is required to manipulate cgroups v1 and v2 using
libcontainer.
Export `createCgroupConfig` to allow API users to create `config.Cgroups`
objects using directly libcontainer API.
Signed-off-by: Julio Montes <julio.montes@intel.com>
split fs2 package from fs, as mixing up fs and fs2 is very likely to result in
unmaintainable code.
Inspired by containerd/cgroups#109
Fix#2157
Signed-off-by: Akihiro Suda <akihiro.suda.cz@hco.ntt.co.jp>
The libcontainer network statistics are unreachable without manually
creating a libcontainer instance. To retrieve them via the CLI interface
of runc, we now expose them as well.
Signed-off-by: Sascha Grunert <sgrunert@suse.com>
As the baby step, only unit tests are executed.
Failing tests are currently skipped and will be fixed in follow-up PRs.
Fix#2124
Signed-off-by: Akihiro Suda <akihiro.suda.cz@hco.ntt.co.jp>
/proc/cgroups is meaningless for v2 and should be ignored.
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/v5.3/Documentation/admin-guide/cgroup-v2.rst#deprecated-v1-core-features
* Now GetAllSubsystems() parses /sys/fs/cgroup/cgroup.controller, not /proc/cgroups.
The function result also contains "pseudo" controllers: {"devices", "freezer"}.
As it is hard to detect availability of pseudo controllers, pseudo controllers
are always assumed to be available.
* Now IOGroupV2.Name() returns "io", not "blkio"
Fix#2155#2156
Signed-off-by: Akihiro Suda <akihiro.suda.cz@hco.ntt.co.jp>
Bind-mount /sys/fs/cgroup when we are in UserNS but CgroupNS is not unshared,
because we cannot mount cgroup2.
This behavior correspond to crun v0.10.2.
Fix#2158
Signed-off-by: Akihiro Suda <akihiro.suda.cz@hco.ntt.co.jp>
The `static_build` build tag was introduced in e9944d0f
to remove build warnings related to systemd cgroup driver
dependencies. Since then, those dependencies have changed and
building the systemd cgroup driver no longer imports dlopen.
After this change, runc builds will always include the systemd
cgroup driver.
This fixes#2008.
Signed-off-by: James Peach <jpeach@apache.org>
Implemented `runc ps` for cgroup v2 , using a newly added method `m.GetUnifiedPath()`.
Unlike the v1 implementation that checks `m.GetPaths()["devices"]`, the v2 implementation does not require the device controller to be available.
Signed-off-by: Akihiro Suda <akihiro.suda.cz@hco.ntt.co.jp>
This is an additional mitigation for CVE-2019-16884. The primary problem
is that Docker can be coerced into bind-mounting a file system on top of
/proc (resulting in label-related writes to /proc no longer happening).
While we are working on mitigations against permitting the mounts, this
helps avoid our code from being tricked into writing to non-procfs
files. This is not a perfect solution (after all, there might be a
bind-mount of a different procfs file over the target) but in order to
exploit that you would need to be able to tweak a config.json pretty
specifically (which thankfully Docker doesn't allow).
Specifically this stops AppArmor from not labeling a process silently
due to /proc/self/attr/... being incorrectly set, and stops any
accidental fd leaks because /proc/self/fd/... is not real.
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
Fixes#2128
This allows proc to be bind mounted for host and rootless namespace usecases but
it removes the ability to mount over the top of proc with a directory.
```bash
> sudo docker run --rm apparmor
docker: Error response from daemon: OCI runtime create failed:
container_linux.go:346: starting container process caused "process_linux.go:449:
container init caused \"rootfs_linux.go:58: mounting
\\\"/var/lib/docker/volumes/aae28ea068c33d60e64d1a75916cf3ec2dc3634f97571854c9ed30c8401460c1/_data\\\"
to rootfs
\\\"/var/lib/docker/overlay2/a6be5ae911bf19f8eecb23a295dec85be9a8ee8da66e9fb55b47c841d1e381b7/merged\\\"
at \\\"/proc\\\" caused
\\\"\\\\\\\"/var/lib/docker/overlay2/a6be5ae911bf19f8eecb23a295dec85be9a8ee8da66e9fb55b47c841d1e381b7/merged/proc\\\\\\\"
cannot be mounted because it is not of type proc\\\"\"": unknown.
> sudo docker run --rm -v /proc:/proc apparmor
docker-default (enforce) root 18989 0.9 0.0 1288 4 ?
Ss 16:47 0:00 sleep 20
```
Signed-off-by: Michael Crosby <crosbymichael@gmail.com>
Qiang Huang
Aleksa Sarai
Kir Kolyshkin
Mrunal Patel
Boris Popovschi
Akihiro Suda
Michael Crosby
Jordan Liggitt
Julio Montes
Sascha Grunert
James Peach
Radostin Stoyanov
tianye15
Julia Nedialkova
blacktop
Jonathan Rudenberg