This will permit us to extend the internals of systemd.Manager to include
further information about the system, such as whether cgroupv1, cgroupv2 or
both are in effect.
Furthermore, it allows a future refactor of moving more of UseSystemd() code
into the factory initialization function.
Signed-off-by: Filipe Brandenburger <filbranden@gmail.com>
Minor refactoring to use the filePair struct for both init sock and log pipe
Co-authored-by: Julia Nedialkova <julianedialkova@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Georgi Sabev <georgethebeatle@gmail.com>
In the exception handling of initProcess.start(), we need to add the
missing IntelRdtManager.Destroy() handler in defer func.
Signed-off-by: Xiaochen Shen <xiaochen.shen@intel.com>
Bump logrus so that we can use logrus.StandardLogger().Logf instead
Co-authored-by: Julia Nedialkova <julianedialkova@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Georgi Sabev <georgethebeatle@gmail.com>
We discovered in umoci that setting a dummy type of "none" would result
in file-based bind-mounts no longer working properly, which is caused by
a restriction for when specconv will change the device type to "bind" to
work around rootfs_linux.go's ... issues.
However, bind-mounts don't have a type (and Linux will ignore any type
specifier you give it) because the type is copied from the source of the
bind-mount. So we should always overwrite it to avoid user confusion.
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
Refactor configuring logging into a reusable component
so that it can be nicely used in both main() and init process init()
Co-authored-by: Georgi Sabev <georgethebeatle@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Giuseppe Capizzi <gcapizzi@pivotal.io>
Co-authored-by: Claudia Beresford <cberesford@pivotal.io>
Signed-off-by: Danail Branekov <danailster@gmail.com>
Add support for children processes logging (including nsexec).
A pipe is used to send logs from children to parent in JSON.
The JSON format used is the same used by logrus JSON formatted,
i.e. children process can use standard logrus APIs.
Signed-off-by: Marco Vedovati <mvedovati@suse.com>
On some machines when setting the SELinux key labels to "", we are seeing
failures that cause runc to fail. Even if SELinux is disabled.
This check will ignore callers calling SELinux Set*Label functions with ""
when SELinux is disabled.
Signed-off-by: Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
Whenever processes are spawned using nsexec, a zombie runc:[1:CHILD]
process will always be created and will need to be reaped by the parent
Signed-off-by: Alex Fang <littlelightlittlefire@gmail.com>
The additional test shows as a separate job. It sets environment
RUNC_USE_SYSTEMD=1 so it will be clear in Travis-CI that this job is
testing the systemd cgroup driver.
Signed-off-by: Filipe Brandenburger <filbranden@google.com>
These tests sometimes hang, so let's skip them for now.
Tested:
$ sudo make localintegration TESTPATH='/checkpoint.bats' RUNC_USE_SYSTEMD=1
The 5 tests in this test suite will be skipped.
Signed-off-by: Filipe Brandenburger <filbranden@google.com>
When $RUNC_USE_SYSTEMD is set, then use a systemd syntax for the
cgroupsPath. Also fix $CGROUPS_PATH to look under the actual path to the
slice/scope created by systemd.
Tested:
$ sudo make localintegration TESTPATH='/cgroups.bats' RUNC_USE_SYSTEMD=1
That test will fail without this commit.
Signed-off-by: Filipe Brandenburger <filbranden@google.com>
This allows us to test runc using libcontainer's systemd driver, by
passing an extra `--systemd-cgroup` argument to the calls to runc.
Tested:
$ sudo make localintegration TESTPATH='/exec.bats' RUNC_USE_SYSTEMD=1
And confirmed that systemd was in use by looking at creation and removal
of libcontainer_<pid>_systemd_test_default.slice test slices. Also
introduced a breakage in systemd cgroup driver and confirmed that the
tests failed as expected.
Signed-off-by: Filipe Brandenburger <filbranden@google.com>
secure_getenv is a Glibc extension and so this code does not compile
on Musl libc any more after this patch.
secure_getenv is only intended to be used in setuid binaries, in
order that they should not trust their environment. It simply returns
NULL if the binary is running setuid. If runc was installed setuid,
the user can already do anything as root, so it is game over, so this
check is not needed.
Signed-off-by: Justin Cormack <justin.cormack@docker.com>
Work is ongoing in the kernel to support different kernel
keyrings per user namespace. We want to allow SELinux to manage
kernel keyrings inside of the container.
Currently when runc creates the kernel keyring it gets the label which runc is
running with ususally `container_runtime_t`, with this change the kernel keyring
will be labeled with the container process label container_t:s0:C1,c2.
Container running as container_t:s0:c1,c2 can manage keyrings with the same label.
This change required a revendoring or the SELinux go bindings.
github.com/opencontainers/selinux.
Signed-off-by: Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
There are some circumstances where sendfile(2) can fail (one example is
that AppArmor appears to block writing to deleted files with sendfile(2)
under some circumstances) and so we need to have a userspace fallback.
It's fairly trivial (and handles short-writes).
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
The usage of memfd_create(2) and other copying techniques is quite
wasteful, despite attempts to minimise it with _LIBCONTAINER_STATEDIR.
memfd_create(2) added ~10M of memory usage to the cgroup associated with
the container, which can result in some setups getting OOM'd (or just
hogging the hosts' memory when you have lots of created-but-not-started
containers sticking around).
The easiest way of solving this is by creating a read-only bind-mount of
the binary, opening that read-only bindmount, and then umounting it to
ensure that the host won't accidentally be re-mounted read-write. This
avoids all copying and cleans up naturally like the other techniques
used. Unfortunately, like the O_TMPFILE fallback, this requires being
able to create a file inside _LIBCONTAINER_STATEDIR (since bind-mounting
over the most obvious path -- /proc/self/exe -- is a *very bad idea*).
Unfortunately detecting this isn't fool-proof -- on a system with a
read-only root filesystem (that might become read-write during "runc
init" execution), we cannot tell whether we have already done an ro
remount. As a partial mitigation, we store a _LIBCONTAINER_CLONED_BINARY
environment variable which is checked *alongside* the protection being
present.
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
Writing a file to tmpfs actually incurs a memcg penalty, and thus the
benefit of being able to disable memfd_create(2) with
_LIBCONTAINER_DISABLE_MEMFD_CLONE is fairly minimal -- though it should
be noted that quite a few distributions don't use tmpfs for /tmp (and
instead have it as a regular directory or subvolume of the host
filesystem).
Since runc must have write access to the state directory anyway (and the
state directory is usually not on a tmpfs) we can use that instead of
/tmp -- avoiding potential memcg costs with no real downside.
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
Qiang Huang
Mrunal Patel
Giuseppe Scrivano
Michael Crosby
Filipe Brandenburger
Aleksa Sarai
Daniel J Walsh
Georgi Sabev
Xiaochen Shen
Xiao YongBiao
Danail Branekov
Marco Vedovati
lifubang
Alex Fang
Daniel, Dao Quang Minh
Filipe Brandenburger
Justin Cormack
Vincent Batts