Refs #28592 -- Removed redundant spaces in docs/ref/csrf.txt.
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@ -6,10 +6,10 @@ Cross Site Request Forgery protection
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:synopsis: Protects against Cross Site Request Forgeries
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The CSRF middleware and template tag provides easy-to-use protection against
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`Cross Site Request Forgeries`_. This type of attack occurs when a malicious
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`Cross Site Request Forgeries`_. This type of attack occurs when a malicious
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website contains a link, a form button or some JavaScript that is intended to
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perform some action on your website, using the credentials of a logged-in user
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who visits the malicious site in their browser. A related type of attack,
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who visits the malicious site in their browser. A related type of attack,
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'login CSRF', where an attacking site tricks a user's browser into logging into
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a site with someone else's credentials, is also covered.
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@ -213,13 +213,13 @@ Rejected requests
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=================
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By default, a '403 Forbidden' response is sent to the user if an incoming
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request fails the checks performed by ``CsrfViewMiddleware``. This should
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request fails the checks performed by ``CsrfViewMiddleware``. This should
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usually only be seen when there is a genuine Cross Site Request Forgery, or
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when, due to a programming error, the CSRF token has not been included with a
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POST form.
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The error page, however, is not very friendly, so you may want to provide your
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own view for handling this condition. To do this, set the
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own view for handling this condition. To do this, set the
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:setting:`CSRF_FAILURE_VIEW` setting.
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CSRF failures are logged as warnings to the :ref:`django.security.csrf
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@ -359,9 +359,9 @@ Testing
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The ``CsrfViewMiddleware`` will usually be a big hindrance to testing view
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functions, due to the need for the CSRF token which must be sent with every POST
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request. For this reason, Django's HTTP client for tests has been modified to
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request. For this reason, Django's HTTP client for tests has been modified to
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set a flag on requests which relaxes the middleware and the ``csrf_protect``
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decorator so that they no longer rejects requests. In every other respect
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decorator so that they no longer rejects requests. In every other respect
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(e.g. sending cookies etc.), they behave the same.
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If, for some reason, you *want* the test client to perform CSRF
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@ -377,10 +377,10 @@ Limitations
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===========
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Subdomains within a site will be able to set cookies on the client for the whole
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domain. By setting the cookie and using a corresponding token, subdomains will
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be able to circumvent the CSRF protection. The only way to avoid this is to
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domain. By setting the cookie and using a corresponding token, subdomains will
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be able to circumvent the CSRF protection. The only way to avoid this is to
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ensure that subdomains are controlled by trusted users (or, are at least unable
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to set cookies). Note that even without CSRF, there are other vulnerabilities,
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to set cookies). Note that even without CSRF, there are other vulnerabilities,
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such as session fixation, that make giving subdomains to untrusted parties a bad
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idea, and these vulnerabilities cannot easily be fixed with current browsers.
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@ -503,7 +503,7 @@ Contrib and reusable apps
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Because it is possible for the developer to turn off the ``CsrfViewMiddleware``,
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all relevant views in contrib apps use the ``csrf_protect`` decorator to ensure
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the security of these applications against CSRF. It is recommended that the
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the security of these applications against CSRF. It is recommended that the
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developers of other reusable apps that want the same guarantees also use the
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``csrf_protect`` decorator on their views.
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