mirror of https://github.com/django/django.git
Fixed CVE-2023-43665 -- Mitigated potential DoS in django.utils.text.Truncator when truncating HTML text.
Thanks Wenchao Li of Alibaba Group for the report.
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@ -83,8 +83,14 @@ def add_truncation_text(text, truncate=None):
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class Truncator(SimpleLazyObject):
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"""
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An object used to truncate text, either by characters or words.
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When truncating HTML text (either chars or words), input will be limited to
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at most `MAX_LENGTH_HTML` characters.
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"""
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# 5 million characters are approximately 4000 text pages or 3 web pages.
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MAX_LENGTH_HTML = 5_000_000
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def __init__(self, text):
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super().__init__(lambda: str(text))
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@ -165,6 +171,11 @@ class Truncator(SimpleLazyObject):
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if words and length <= 0:
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return ""
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size_limited = False
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if len(text) > self.MAX_LENGTH_HTML:
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text = text[: self.MAX_LENGTH_HTML]
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size_limited = True
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html4_singlets = (
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"br",
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"col",
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@ -221,10 +232,14 @@ class Truncator(SimpleLazyObject):
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# Add it to the start of the open tags list
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open_tags.insert(0, tagname)
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if current_len <= length:
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return text
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out = text[:end_text_pos]
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truncate_text = add_truncation_text("", truncate)
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if current_len <= length:
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if size_limited and truncate_text:
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text += truncate_text
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return text
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out = text[:end_text_pos]
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if truncate_text:
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out += truncate_text
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# Close any tags still open
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@ -2648,6 +2648,16 @@ If ``value`` is ``"<p>Joel is a slug</p>"``, the output will be
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Newlines in the HTML content will be preserved.
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.. admonition:: Size of input string
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Processing large, potentially malformed HTML strings can be
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resource-intensive and impact service performance. ``truncatechars_html``
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limits input to the first five million characters.
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.. versionchanged:: 3.2.22
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In older versions, strings over five million characters were processed.
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.. templatefilter:: truncatewords
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``truncatewords``
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@ -2690,6 +2700,16 @@ If ``value`` is ``"<p>Joel is a slug</p>"``, the output will be
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Newlines in the HTML content will be preserved.
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.. admonition:: Size of input string
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Processing large, potentially malformed HTML strings can be
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resource-intensive and impact service performance. ``truncatewords_html``
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limits input to the first five million characters.
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.. versionchanged:: 3.2.22
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In older versions, strings over five million characters were processed.
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.. templatefilter:: unordered_list
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``unordered_list``
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@ -6,4 +6,20 @@ Django 3.2.22 release notes
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Django 3.2.22 fixes a security issue with severity "moderate" in 3.2.21.
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...
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CVE-2023-43665: Denial-of-service possibility in ``django.utils.text.Truncator``
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================================================================================
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Following the fix for :cve:`2019-14232`, the regular expressions used in the
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implementation of ``django.utils.text.Truncator``'s ``chars()`` and ``words()``
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methods (with ``html=True``) were revised and improved. However, these regular
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expressions still exhibited linear backtracking complexity, so when given a
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very long, potentially malformed HTML input, the evaluation would still be
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slow, leading to a potential denial of service vulnerability.
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The ``chars()`` and ``words()`` methods are used to implement the
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:tfilter:`truncatechars_html` and :tfilter:`truncatewords_html` template
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filters, which were thus also vulnerable.
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The input processed by ``Truncator``, when operating in HTML mode, has been
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limited to the first five million characters in order to avoid potential
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performance and memory issues.
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@ -6,4 +6,20 @@ Django 4.1.12 release notes
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Django 4.1.12 fixes a security issue with severity "moderate" in 4.1.11.
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...
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CVE-2023-43665: Denial-of-service possibility in ``django.utils.text.Truncator``
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================================================================================
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Following the fix for :cve:`2019-14232`, the regular expressions used in the
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implementation of ``django.utils.text.Truncator``'s ``chars()`` and ``words()``
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methods (with ``html=True``) were revised and improved. However, these regular
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expressions still exhibited linear backtracking complexity, so when given a
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very long, potentially malformed HTML input, the evaluation would still be
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slow, leading to a potential denial of service vulnerability.
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The ``chars()`` and ``words()`` methods are used to implement the
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:tfilter:`truncatechars_html` and :tfilter:`truncatewords_html` template
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filters, which were thus also vulnerable.
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The input processed by ``Truncator``, when operating in HTML mode, has been
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limited to the first five million characters in order to avoid potential
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performance and memory issues.
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@ -7,6 +7,24 @@ Django 4.2.6 release notes
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Django 4.2.6 fixes a security issue with severity "moderate" and several bugs
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in 4.2.5.
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CVE-2023-43665: Denial-of-service possibility in ``django.utils.text.Truncator``
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================================================================================
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Following the fix for :cve:`2019-14232`, the regular expressions used in the
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implementation of ``django.utils.text.Truncator``'s ``chars()`` and ``words()``
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methods (with ``html=True``) were revised and improved. However, these regular
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expressions still exhibited linear backtracking complexity, so when given a
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very long, potentially malformed HTML input, the evaluation would still be
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slow, leading to a potential denial of service vulnerability.
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The ``chars()`` and ``words()`` methods are used to implement the
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:tfilter:`truncatechars_html` and :tfilter:`truncatewords_html` template
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filters, which were thus also vulnerable.
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The input processed by ``Truncator``, when operating in HTML mode, has been
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limited to the first five million characters in order to avoid potential
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performance and memory issues.
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Bugfixes
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========
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@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
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import json
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import sys
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from unittest.mock import patch
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from django.core.exceptions import SuspiciousFileOperation
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from django.test import SimpleTestCase
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@ -94,11 +95,17 @@ class TestUtilsText(SimpleTestCase):
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text.Truncator(lazystr("The quick brown fox")).chars(10), "The quick…"
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)
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def test_truncate_chars_html(self):
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@patch("django.utils.text.Truncator.MAX_LENGTH_HTML", 10_000)
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def test_truncate_chars_html_size_limit(self):
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max_len = text.Truncator.MAX_LENGTH_HTML
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bigger_len = text.Truncator.MAX_LENGTH_HTML + 1
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valid_html = "<p>Joel is a slug</p>" # 14 chars
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perf_test_values = [
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(("</a" + "\t" * 50000) + "//>", None),
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("&" * 50000, "&" * 9 + "…"),
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("</a" + "\t" * (max_len - 6) + "//>", None),
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("</p" + "\t" * bigger_len + "//>", "</p" + "\t" * 6 + "…"),
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("&" * bigger_len, "&" * 9 + "…"),
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("_X<<<<<<<<<<<>", None),
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(valid_html * bigger_len, "<p>Joel is a…</p>"), # 10 chars
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]
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for value, expected in perf_test_values:
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with self.subTest(value=value):
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@ -176,15 +183,25 @@ class TestUtilsText(SimpleTestCase):
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truncator = text.Truncator("<p>I <3 python, what about you?</p>")
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self.assertEqual("<p>I <3 python,…</p>", truncator.words(3, html=True))
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@patch("django.utils.text.Truncator.MAX_LENGTH_HTML", 10_000)
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def test_truncate_words_html_size_limit(self):
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max_len = text.Truncator.MAX_LENGTH_HTML
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bigger_len = text.Truncator.MAX_LENGTH_HTML + 1
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valid_html = "<p>Joel is a slug</p>" # 4 words
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perf_test_values = [
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("</a" + "\t" * 50000) + "//>",
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"&" * 50000,
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"_X<<<<<<<<<<<>",
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("</a" + "\t" * (max_len - 6) + "//>", None),
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("</p" + "\t" * bigger_len + "//>", "</p" + "\t" * (max_len - 3) + "…"),
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("&" * max_len, None), # no change
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("&" * bigger_len, "&" * max_len + "…"),
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("_X<<<<<<<<<<<>", None),
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(valid_html * bigger_len, valid_html * 12 + "<p>Joel is…</p>"), # 50 words
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]
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for value in perf_test_values:
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for value, expected in perf_test_values:
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with self.subTest(value=value):
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truncator = text.Truncator(value)
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self.assertEqual(value, truncator.words(50, html=True))
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self.assertEqual(
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expected if expected else value, truncator.words(50, html=True)
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)
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def test_wrap(self):
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digits = "1234 67 9"
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