[3.1.x] Changed docs and a code comment to use gender-neutral pronouns.

Follow up to e1b7723817.

Backport of 477c800443 from master.
This commit is contained in:
Nick Pope 2020-11-13 21:26:30 +00:00 committed by Mariusz Felisiak
parent eba8d6f5d7
commit 1f6e7fb4ab
7 changed files with 7 additions and 7 deletions

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@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ Pull requests at GitHub have only two states: open and closed. The committer
who will deal with your pull request has only two options: merge it or close
it. For this reason, it isn't useful to make a pull request until the code is
ready for merging -- or sufficiently close that a committer will finish it
himself.
themselves.
Rebasing branches
-----------------

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@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ provided by the admin.
.. _custom-admin-action:
For example, we can use ``self`` to flash a message to the user informing her
For example, we can use ``self`` to flash a message to the user informing them
that the action was successful::
from django.contrib import messages

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@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Mitigating a remote-code execution vulnerability in :mod:`django.contrib.session
session data before storing it in the backend. If you're using the :ref:`signed
cookie session backend<cookie-session-backend>` and :setting:`SECRET_KEY` is
known by an attacker (there isn't an inherent vulnerability in Django that
would cause it to leak), the attacker could insert a string into his session
would cause it to leak), the attacker could insert a string into their session
which, when unpickled, executes arbitrary code on the server. The technique for
doing so is simple and easily available on the internet. Although the cookie
session storage signs the cookie-stored data to prevent tampering, a

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@ -797,7 +797,7 @@ Historically, :mod:`django.contrib.sessions` used :mod:`pickle` to serialize
session data before storing it in the backend. If you're using the :ref:`signed
cookie session backend<cookie-session-backend>` and :setting:`SECRET_KEY` is
known by an attacker (there isn't an inherent vulnerability in Django that
would cause it to leak), the attacker could insert a string into his session
would cause it to leak), the attacker could insert a string into their session
which, when unpickled, executes arbitrary code on the server. The technique for
doing so is simple and easily available on the internet. Although the cookie
session storage signs the cookie-stored data to prevent tampering, a

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@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ Queries can go round in circles::
>>> Reporter.objects.filter(article__reporter=r).distinct()
<QuerySet [<Reporter: John Smith>]>
If you delete a reporter, his articles will be deleted (assuming that the
If you delete a reporter, their articles will be deleted (assuming that the
ForeignKey was defined with :attr:`django.db.models.ForeignKey.on_delete` set to
``CASCADE``, which is the default)::

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@ -377,7 +377,7 @@ class ManyToOneTests(TestCase):
pub_date=datetime.date(2005, 7, 27),
reporter_id=str(self.r.id),
)
# If you delete a reporter, his articles will be deleted.
# If you delete a reporter, their articles will be deleted.
self.assertQuerysetEqual(
Article.objects.all(),
[

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@ -24,4 +24,4 @@ def template_response_view(request):
def snark(request):
return HttpResponse('Found him!')
return HttpResponse('Found them!')