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Fixed #16010 -- Added Origin header checking to CSRF middleware. 

Thanks David Benjamin for the original patch, and Florian
Apolloner, Chris Jerdonek, and Adam Johnson for reviews.
This commit is contained in:
Tim Graham 2021-01-02 18:46:17 -05:00 committed by Mariusz Felisiak
parent dba44a7a7a
commit 2411b8b5eb
5 changed files with 238 additions and 13 deletions
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51
django/middleware/csrf.py
View File

@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ against request forgeries from other sites.
import logging
import re
import string
from collections import defaultdict
from urllib.parse import urlparse
from django.conf import settings
@ -21,6 +22,7 @@ from django.utils.log import log_response
logger = logging.getLogger('django.security.csrf')
REASON_BAD_ORIGIN = "Origin checking failed - %s does not match any trusted origins."
REASON_NO_REFERER = "Referer checking failed - no Referer."
REASON_BAD_REFERER = "Referer checking failed - %s does not match any trusted origins."
REASON_NO_CSRF_COOKIE = "CSRF cookie not set."
@ -144,6 +146,24 @@ class CsrfViewMiddleware(MiddlewareMixin):
for origin in settings.CSRF_TRUSTED_ORIGINS
]
@cached_property
def allowed_origins_exact(self):
return {
origin for origin in settings.CSRF_TRUSTED_ORIGINS
if '*' not in origin
}
@cached_property
def allowed_origin_subdomains(self):
"""
A mapping of allowed schemes to list of allowed netlocs, where all
subdomains of the netloc are allowed.
"""
allowed_origin_subdomains = defaultdict(list)
for parsed in (urlparse(origin) for origin in settings.CSRF_TRUSTED_ORIGINS if '*' in origin):
allowed_origin_subdomains[parsed.scheme].append(parsed.netloc.lstrip('*'))
return allowed_origin_subdomains
# The _accept and _reject methods currently only exist for the sake of the
# requires_csrf_token decorator.
def _accept(self, request):
@ -204,6 +224,27 @@ class CsrfViewMiddleware(MiddlewareMixin):
# Set the Vary header since content varies with the CSRF cookie.
patch_vary_headers(response, ('Cookie',))
def _origin_verified(self, request):
request_origin = request.META['HTTP_ORIGIN']
good_origin = '%s://%s' % (
'https' if request.is_secure() else 'http',
request.get_host(),
)
if request_origin == good_origin:
return True
if request_origin in self.allowed_origins_exact:
return True
try:
parsed_origin = urlparse(request_origin)
except ValueError:
return False
request_scheme = parsed_origin.scheme
request_netloc = parsed_origin.netloc
return any(
is_same_domain(request_netloc, host)
for host in self.allowed_origin_subdomains.get(request_scheme, ())
)
def process_request(self, request):
csrf_token = self._get_token(request)
if csrf_token is not None:
@ -229,7 +270,15 @@ class CsrfViewMiddleware(MiddlewareMixin):
# branches that call reject().
return self._accept(request)
if request.is_secure():
# Reject the request if the Origin header doesn't match an allowed
# value.
if 'HTTP_ORIGIN' in request.META:
if not self._origin_verified(request):
return self._reject(request, REASON_BAD_ORIGIN % request.META['HTTP_ORIGIN'])
elif request.is_secure():
# If the Origin header wasn't provided, reject HTTPS requests
# if the Referer header doesn't match an allowed value.
#
# Suppose user visits http://example.com/
# An active network attacker (man-in-the-middle, MITM) sends a
# POST form that targets https://example.com/detonate-bomb/ and

18
docs/ref/csrf.txt
View File

@ -263,10 +263,15 @@ The CSRF protection is based on the following things:
This check is done by ``CsrfViewMiddleware``.
#. In addition, for HTTPS requests, strict referer checking is done by
``CsrfViewMiddleware``. This means that even if a subdomain can set or
modify cookies on your domain, it can't force a user to post to your
application since that request won't come from your own exact domain.
#. ``CsrfViewMiddleware`` verifies the `Origin header`_, if provided by the
browser, against the current host and the :setting:`CSRF_TRUSTED_ORIGINS`
setting. This provides protection against cross-subdomain attacks.
#. In addition, for HTTPS requests, if the ``Origin`` header isn't provided,
``CsrfViewMiddleware`` performs strict referer checking. This means that
even if a subdomain can set or modify cookies on your domain, it can't force
a user to post to your application since that request won't come from your
own exact domain.
This also addresses a man-in-the-middle attack that's possible under HTTPS
when using a session independent secret, due to the fact that HTTP
@ -284,6 +289,10 @@ The CSRF protection is based on the following things:
Expanding the accepted referers beyond the current host or cookie domain can
be done with the :setting:`CSRF_TRUSTED_ORIGINS` setting.
.. versionadded:: 4.0
``Origin`` checking was added, as described above.
This ensures that only forms that have originated from trusted domains can be
used to POST data back.
@ -314,6 +323,7 @@ vulnerability allows and much worse).
sites.
.. _BREACH: http://breachattack.com/
.. _Origin header: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Origin
.. _disable the referer: https://www.w3.org/TR/referrer-policy/#referrer-policy-delivery
Caching

19
docs/ref/settings.txt
View File

@ -459,13 +459,18 @@ Default: ``[]`` (Empty list)
A list of trusted origins for unsafe requests (e.g. ``POST``).
For requests that include the ``Origin`` header, Django's CSRF protection
requires that header match the origin present in the ``Host`` header.
For a :meth:`secure <django.http.HttpRequest.is_secure>` unsafe
request, Django's CSRF protection requires that the request have a ``Referer``
header that matches the origin present in the ``Host`` header. This prevents,
for example, a ``POST`` request from ``subdomain.example.com`` from succeeding
against ``api.example.com``. If you need cross-origin unsafe requests over
HTTPS, continuing the example, add ``'https://subdomain.example.com'`` to this
list (and/or ``http://...`` if requests originate from an insecure page).
request that doesn't include the ``Origin`` header, the request must have a
``Referer`` header that matches the origin present in the ``Host`` header.
These checks prevent, for example, a ``POST`` request from
``subdomain.example.com`` from succeeding against ``api.example.com``. If you
need cross-origin unsafe requests, continuing the example, add
``'https://subdomain.example.com'`` to this list (and/or ``http://...`` if
requests originate from an insecure page).
The setting also supports subdomains, so you could add
``'https://*.example.com'``, for example, to allow access from all subdomains
@ -476,6 +481,8 @@ of ``example.com``.
The values in older versions must only include the hostname (possibly with
a leading dot) and not the scheme or an asterisk.
Also, ``Origin`` header checking isn't performed in older versions.
.. setting:: DATABASES
``DATABASES``

13
docs/releases/4.0.txt
View File

@ -149,7 +149,9 @@ Cache
CSRF
~~~~
* ...
* CSRF protection now consults the ``Origin`` header, if present. To facilitate
this, :ref:`some changes <csrf-trusted-origins-changes-4.0>` to the
:setting:`CSRF_TRUSTED_ORIGINS` setting are required.
Decorators
~~~~~~~~~~
@ -323,6 +325,15 @@ the dot. For example, change ``'.example.com'`` to ``'https://*.example.com'``.
A system check detects any required changes.
Configuring it may now be required
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
As CSRF protection now consults the ``Origin`` header, you may need to set
:setting:`CSRF_TRUSTED_ORIGINS`, particularly if you allow requests from
subdomains by setting :setting:`CSRF_COOKIE_DOMAIN` (or
:setting:`SESSION_COOKIE_DOMAIN` if :setting:`CSRF_USE_SESSIONS` is enabled) to
a value starting with a dot.
Miscellaneous
-------------

150
tests/csrf_tests/tests.py
View File

@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ from django.contrib.sessions.backends.cache import SessionStore
from django.core.exceptions import ImproperlyConfigured
from django.http import HttpRequest, HttpResponse
from django.middleware.csrf import (
CSRF_SESSION_KEY, CSRF_TOKEN_LENGTH, REASON_BAD_TOKEN,
CSRF_SESSION_KEY, CSRF_TOKEN_LENGTH, REASON_BAD_ORIGIN, REASON_BAD_TOKEN,
REASON_NO_CSRF_COOKIE, CsrfViewMiddleware,
_compare_masked_tokens as equivalent_tokens, get_token,
)
@ -510,6 +510,154 @@ class CsrfViewMiddlewareTestMixin:
self.assertEqual(resp.status_code, 403)
self.assertEqual(cm.records[0].getMessage(), 'Forbidden (%s): ' % REASON_BAD_TOKEN)
@override_settings(ALLOWED_HOSTS=['www.example.com'])
def test_bad_origin_bad_domain(self):
"""A request with a bad origin is rejected."""
req = self._get_POST_request_with_token()
req.META['HTTP_HOST'] = 'www.example.com'
req.META['HTTP_ORIGIN'] = 'https://www.evil.org'
mw = CsrfViewMiddleware(post_form_view)
self.assertIs(mw._origin_verified(req), False)
with self.assertLogs('django.security.csrf', 'WARNING') as cm:
response = mw.process_view(req, post_form_view, (), {})
self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 403)
msg = REASON_BAD_ORIGIN % req.META['HTTP_ORIGIN']
self.assertEqual(cm.records[0].getMessage(), 'Forbidden (%s): ' % msg)
@override_settings(ALLOWED_HOSTS=['www.example.com'])
def test_bad_origin_null_origin(self):
"""A request with a null origin is rejected."""
req = self._get_POST_request_with_token()
req.META['HTTP_HOST'] = 'www.example.com'
req.META['HTTP_ORIGIN'] = 'null'
mw = CsrfViewMiddleware(post_form_view)
self.assertIs(mw._origin_verified(req), False)
with self.assertLogs('django.security.csrf', 'WARNING') as cm:
response = mw.process_view(req, post_form_view, (), {})
self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 403)
msg = REASON_BAD_ORIGIN % req.META['HTTP_ORIGIN']
self.assertEqual(cm.records[0].getMessage(), 'Forbidden (%s): ' % msg)
@override_settings(ALLOWED_HOSTS=['www.example.com'])
def test_bad_origin_bad_protocol(self):
"""A request with an origin with wrong protocol is rejected."""
req = self._get_POST_request_with_token()
req._is_secure_override = True
req.META['HTTP_HOST'] = 'www.example.com'
req.META['HTTP_ORIGIN'] = 'http://example.com'
mw = CsrfViewMiddleware(post_form_view)
self.assertIs(mw._origin_verified(req), False)
with self.assertLogs('django.security.csrf', 'WARNING') as cm:
response = mw.process_view(req, post_form_view, (), {})
self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 403)
msg = REASON_BAD_ORIGIN % req.META['HTTP_ORIGIN']
self.assertEqual(cm.records[0].getMessage(), 'Forbidden (%s): ' % msg)
@override_settings(
ALLOWED_HOSTS=['www.example.com'],
CSRF_TRUSTED_ORIGINS=[
'http://no-match.com',
'https://*.example.com',
'http://*.no-match.com',
'http://*.no-match-2.com',
],
)
def test_bad_origin_csrf_trusted_origin_bad_protocol(self):
"""
A request with an origin with the wrong protocol compared to
CSRF_TRUSTED_ORIGINS is rejected.
"""
req = self._get_POST_request_with_token()
req._is_secure_override = True
req.META['HTTP_HOST'] = 'www.example.com'
req.META['HTTP_ORIGIN'] = 'http://foo.example.com'
mw = CsrfViewMiddleware(post_form_view)
self.assertIs(mw._origin_verified(req), False)
with self.assertLogs('django.security.csrf', 'WARNING') as cm:
response = mw.process_view(req, post_form_view, (), {})
self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 403)
msg = REASON_BAD_ORIGIN % req.META['HTTP_ORIGIN']
self.assertEqual(cm.records[0].getMessage(), 'Forbidden (%s): ' % msg)
self.assertEqual(mw.allowed_origins_exact, {'http://no-match.com'})
self.assertEqual(mw.allowed_origin_subdomains, {
'https': ['.example.com'],
'http': ['.no-match.com', '.no-match-2.com'],
})
@override_settings(ALLOWED_HOSTS=['www.example.com'])
def test_bad_origin_cannot_be_parsed(self):
"""
A POST request with an origin that can't be parsed by urlparse() is
rejected.
"""
req = self._get_POST_request_with_token()
req.META['HTTP_HOST'] = 'www.example.com'
req.META['HTTP_ORIGIN'] = 'https://['
mw = CsrfViewMiddleware(post_form_view)
self.assertIs(mw._origin_verified(req), False)
with self.assertLogs('django.security.csrf', 'WARNING') as cm:
response = mw.process_view(req, post_form_view, (), {})
self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 403)
msg = REASON_BAD_ORIGIN % req.META['HTTP_ORIGIN']
self.assertEqual(cm.records[0].getMessage(), 'Forbidden (%s): ' % msg)
@override_settings(ALLOWED_HOSTS=['www.example.com'])
def test_good_origin_insecure(self):
"""A POST HTTP request with a good origin is accepted."""
req = self._get_POST_request_with_token()
req.META['HTTP_HOST'] = 'www.example.com'
req.META['HTTP_ORIGIN'] = 'http://www.example.com'
mw = CsrfViewMiddleware(post_form_view)
self.assertIs(mw._origin_verified(req), True)
response = mw.process_view(req, post_form_view, (), {})
self.assertIsNone(response)
@override_settings(ALLOWED_HOSTS=['www.example.com'])
def test_good_origin_secure(self):
"""A POST HTTPS request with a good origin is accepted."""
req = self._get_POST_request_with_token()
req._is_secure_override = True
req.META['HTTP_HOST'] = 'www.example.com'
req.META['HTTP_ORIGIN'] = 'https://www.example.com'
mw = CsrfViewMiddleware(post_form_view)
self.assertIs(mw._origin_verified(req), True)
response = mw.process_view(req, post_form_view, (), {})
self.assertIsNone(response)
@override_settings(ALLOWED_HOSTS=['www.example.com'], CSRF_TRUSTED_ORIGINS=['https://dashboard.example.com'])
def test_good_origin_csrf_trusted_origin_allowed(self):
"""
A POST request with an origin added to the CSRF_TRUSTED_ORIGINS
setting is accepted.
"""
req = self._get_POST_request_with_token()
req._is_secure_override = True
req.META['HTTP_HOST'] = 'www.example.com'
req.META['HTTP_ORIGIN'] = 'https://dashboard.example.com'
mw = CsrfViewMiddleware(post_form_view)
self.assertIs(mw._origin_verified(req), True)
resp = mw.process_view(req, post_form_view, (), {})
self.assertIsNone(resp)
self.assertEqual(mw.allowed_origins_exact, {'https://dashboard.example.com'})
self.assertEqual(mw.allowed_origin_subdomains, {})
@override_settings(ALLOWED_HOSTS=['www.example.com'], CSRF_TRUSTED_ORIGINS=['https://*.example.com'])
def test_good_origin_wildcard_csrf_trusted_origin_allowed(self):
"""
A POST request with an origin that matches a CSRF_TRUSTED_ORIGINS
wildcard is accepted.
"""
req = self._get_POST_request_with_token()
req._is_secure_override = True
req.META['HTTP_HOST'] = 'www.example.com'
req.META['HTTP_ORIGIN'] = 'https://foo.example.com'
mw = CsrfViewMiddleware(post_form_view)
self.assertIs(mw._origin_verified(req), True)
response = mw.process_view(req, post_form_view, (), {})
self.assertIsNone(response)
self.assertEqual(mw.allowed_origins_exact, set())
self.assertEqual(mw.allowed_origin_subdomains, {'https': ['.example.com']})
class CsrfViewMiddlewareTests(CsrfViewMiddlewareTestMixin, SimpleTestCase):