[1.5.x] Added missing release notes for older versions of Django

Backport of 3f6cc33cff from master

docs/releases/1.3.3.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+==========================
+Django 1.3.3 release notes
+==========================
+
+*August 1, 2012*
+
+Following Monday's security release of :doc:`Django 1.3.2 </releases/1.3.2>`,
+we began receiving reports that one of the fixes applied was breaking Python
+2.4 compatibility for Django 1.3. Since Python 2.4 is a supported Python
+version for that release series, this release fixes compatibility with
+Python 2.4.

docs/releases/1.3.4.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+==========================
+Django 1.3.4 release notes
+==========================
+
+*October 17, 2012*
+
+This is the fourth release in the Django 1.3 series.
+
+Host header poisoning
+---------------------
+
+Some parts of Django -- independent of end-user-written applications -- make
+use of full URLs, including domain name, which are generated from the HTTP Host
+header. Some attacks against this are beyond Django's ability to control, and
+require the web server to be properly configured; Django's documentation has
+for some time contained notes advising users on such configuration.
+
+Django's own built-in parsing of the Host header is, however, still vulnerable,
+as was reported to us recently. The Host header parsing in Django 1.3.3 and
+Django 1.4.1 -- specifically, ``django.http.HttpRequest.get_host()`` -- was
+incorrectly handling username/password information in the header. Thus, for
+example, the following Host header would be accepted by Django when running on
+"validsite.com"::
+
+    Host: validsite.com:random@evilsite.com
+
+Using this, an attacker can cause parts of Django -- particularly the
+password-reset mechanism -- to generate and display arbitrary URLs to users.
+
+To remedy this, the parsing in ``HttpRequest.get_host()`` is being modified;
+Host headers which contain potentially dangerous content (such as
+username/password pairs) now raise the exception
+:exc:`django.core.exceptions.SuspiciousOperation`.
+
+Details of this issue were initially posted online as a `security advisory`_.
+
+.. _security advisory: https://www.djangoproject.com/weblog/2012/oct/17/security/

docs/releases/1.3.5.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+==========================
+Django 1.3.5 release notes
+==========================
+
+*December 10, 2012*
+
+Django 1.3.5 addresses two security issues present in previous Django releases
+in the 1.3 series.
+
+Please be aware that this security release is slightly different from previous
+ones. Both issues addressed here have been dealt with in prior security updates
+to Django. In one case, we have received ongoing reports of problems, and in
+the other we've chosen to take further steps to tighten up Django's code in
+response to independent discovery of potential problems from multiple sources.
+
+Host header poisoning
+---------------------
+
+Several earlier Django security releases focused on the issue of poisoning the
+HTTP Host header, causing Django to generate URLs pointing to arbitrary,
+potentially-malicious domains.
+
+In response to further input received and reports of continuing issues
+following the previous release, we're taking additional steps to tighten Host
+header validation. Rather than attempt to accommodate all features HTTP
+supports here, Django's Host header validation attempts to support a smaller,
+but far more common, subset:
+
+* Hostnames must consist of characters [A-Za-z0-9] plus hyphen ('-') or dot
+  ('.').
+* IP addresses -- both IPv4 and IPv6 -- are permitted.
+* Port, if specified, is numeric.
+
+Any deviation from this will now be rejected, raising the exception
+:exc:`django.core.exceptions.SuspiciousOperation`.
+
+Redirect poisoning
+------------------
+
+Also following up on a previous issue: in July of this year, we made changes to
+Django's HTTP redirect classes, performing additional validation of the scheme
+of the URL to redirect to (since, both within Django's own supplied
+applications and many third-party applications, accepting a user-supplied
+redirect target is a common pattern).
+
+Since then, two independent audits of the code turned up further potential
+problems. So, similar to the Host-header issue, we are taking steps to provide
+tighter validation in response to reported problems (primarily with third-party
+applications, but to a certain extent also within Django itself). This comes in
+two parts:
+
+1. A new utility function, ``django.utils.http.is_safe_url``, is added; this
+function takes a URL and a hostname, and checks that the URL is either
+relative, or if absolute matches the supplied hostname. This function is
+intended for use whenever user-supplied redirect targets are accepted, to
+ensure that such redirects cannot lead to arbitrary third-party sites.
+
+2. All of Django's own built-in views -- primarily in the authentication system
+-- which allow user-supplied redirect targets now use ``is_safe_url`` to
+validate the supplied URL.

docs/releases/1.3.6.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+==========================
+Django 1.3.6 release notes
+==========================
+
+*February 19, 2013*
+
+Django 1.3.6 fixes four security issues present in previous Django releases in
+the 1.3 series.
+
+This is the sixth bugfix/security release in the Django 1.3 series.
+
+
+Host header poisoning
+---------------------
+
+Some parts of Django -- independent of end-user-written applications -- make
+use of full URLs, including domain name, which are generated from the HTTP Host
+header. Django's documentation has for some time contained notes advising users
+on how to configure webservers to ensure that only valid Host headers can reach
+the Django application. However, it has been reported to us that even with the
+recommended webserver configurations there are still techniques available for
+tricking many common webservers into supplying the application with an
+incorrect and possibly malicious Host header.
+
+For this reason, Django 1.3.6 adds a new setting, ``ALLOWED_HOSTS``, which
+should contain an explicit list of valid host/domain names for this site. A
+request with a Host header not matching an entry in this list will raise
+``SuspiciousOperation`` if ``request.get_host()`` is called. For full details
+see the documentation for the :setting:`ALLOWED_HOSTS` setting.
+
+The default value for this setting in Django 1.3.6 is ``['*']`` (matching any
+host), for backwards-compatibility, but we strongly encourage all sites to set
+a more restrictive value.
+
+This host validation is disabled when ``DEBUG`` is ``True`` or when running tests.
+
+
+XML deserialization
+-------------------
+
+The XML parser in the Python standard library is vulnerable to a number of
+attacks via external entities and entity expansion. Django uses this parser for
+deserializing XML-formatted database fixtures. The fixture deserializer is not
+intended for use with untrusted data, but in order to err on the side of safety
+in Django 1.3.6 the XML deserializer refuses to parse an XML document with a
+DTD (DOCTYPE definition), which closes off these attack avenues.
+
+These issues in the Python standard library are CVE-2013-1664 and
+CVE-2013-1665. More information available `from the Python security team`_.
+
+Django's XML serializer does not create documents with a DTD, so this should
+not cause any issues with the typical round-trip from ``dumpdata`` to
+``loaddata``, but if you feed your own XML documents to the ``loaddata``
+management command, you will need to ensure they do not contain a DTD.
+
+.. _from the Python security team: http://blog.python.org/2013/02/announcing-defusedxml-fixes-for-xml.html
+
+
+Formset memory exhaustion
+-------------------------
+
+Previous versions of Django did not validate or limit the form-count data
+provided by the client in a formset's management form, making it possible to
+exhaust a server's available memory by forcing it to create very large numbers
+of forms.
+
+In Django 1.3.6, all formsets have a strictly-enforced maximum number of forms
+(1000 by default, though it can be set higher via the ``max_num`` formset
+factory argument).
+
+
+Admin history view information leakage
+--------------------------------------
+
+In previous versions of Django, an admin user without change permission on a
+model could still view the unicode representation of instances via their admin
+history log. Django 1.3.6 now limits the admin history log view for an object
+to users with change permission for that model.

docs/releases/1.3.7.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+==========================
+Django 1.3.7 release notes
+==========================
+
+*February 20, 2013*
+
+Django 1.3.7 corrects a packaging problem with yesterday's :doc:`1.3.6 release
+</releases/1.3.6>`.
+
+The release contained stray ``.pyc`` files that caused "bad magic number"
+errors when running with some versions of Python. This releases corrects this,
+and also fixes a bad documentation link in the project template ``settings.py``
+file generated by ``manage.py startproject``.

docs/releases/1.4.2.txt

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ for some time contained notes advising users on such configuration.
 
 Django's own built-in parsing of the Host header is, however, still vulnerable,
 as was reported to us recently. The Host header parsing in Django 1.3.3 and
-Django 1.4.1 -- specifically, django.http.HttpRequest.get_host() -- was
+Django 1.4.1 -- specifically, ``django.http.HttpRequest.get_host()`` -- was
 incorrectly handling username/password information in the header. Thus, for
 example, the following Host header would be accepted by Django when running on
 "validsite.com"::
@@ -27,9 +27,10 @@ example, the following Host header would be accepted by Django when running on
 Using this, an attacker can cause parts of Django -- particularly the
 password-reset mechanism -- to generate and display arbitrary URLs to users.
 
-To remedy this, the parsing in HttpRequest.get_host() is being modified; Host
-headers which contain potentially dangerous content (such as username/password
-pairs) now raise the exception django.core.exceptions.SuspiciousOperation
+To remedy this, the parsing in ``HttpRequest.get_host()`` is being modified;
+Host headers which contain potentially dangerous content (such as
+username/password pairs) now raise the exception
+:exc:`django.core.exceptions.SuspiciousOperation`.
 
 Details of this issue were initially posted online as a `security advisory`_.
 

docs/releases/1.4.3.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+==========================
+Django 1.4.3 release notes
+==========================
+
+*December 10, 2012*
+
+Django 1.4.3 addresses two security issues present in previous Django releases
+in the 1.4 series.
+
+Please be aware that this security release is slightly different from previous
+ones. Both issues addressed here have been dealt with in prior security updates
+to Django. In one case, we have received ongoing reports of problems, and in
+the other we've chosen to take further steps to tighten up Django's code in
+response to independent discovery of potential problems from multiple sources.
+
+Host header poisoning
+---------------------
+
+Several earlier Django security releases focused on the issue of poisoning the
+HTTP Host header, causing Django to generate URLs pointing to arbitrary,
+potentially-malicious domains.
+
+In response to further input received and reports of continuing issues
+following the previous release, we're taking additional steps to tighten Host
+header validation. Rather than attempt to accommodate all features HTTP
+supports here, Django's Host header validation attempts to support a smaller,
+but far more common, subset:
+
+* Hostnames must consist of characters [A-Za-z0-9] plus hyphen ('-') or dot
+  ('.').
+* IP addresses -- both IPv4 and IPv6 -- are permitted.
+* Port, if specified, is numeric.
+
+Any deviation from this will now be rejected, raising the exception
+:exc:`django.core.exceptions.SuspiciousOperation`.
+
+Redirect poisoning
+------------------
+
+Also following up on a previous issue: in July of this year, we made changes to
+Django's HTTP redirect classes, performing additional validation of the scheme
+of the URL to redirect to (since, both within Django's own supplied
+applications and many third-party applications, accepting a user-supplied
+redirect target is a common pattern).
+
+Since then, two independent audits of the code turned up further potential
+problems. So, similar to the Host-header issue, we are taking steps to provide
+tighter validation in response to reported problems (primarily with third-party
+applications, but to a certain extent also within Django itself). This comes in
+two parts:
+
+1. A new utility function, ``django.utils.http.is_safe_url``, is added; this
+function takes a URL and a hostname, and checks that the URL is either
+relative, or if absolute matches the supplied hostname. This function is
+intended for use whenever user-supplied redirect targets are accepted, to
+ensure that such redirects cannot lead to arbitrary third-party sites.
+
+2. All of Django's own built-in views -- primarily in the authentication system
+-- which allow user-supplied redirect targets now use ``is_safe_url`` to
+validate the supplied URL.

docs/releases/1.4.4.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+==========================
+Django 1.4.4 release notes
+==========================
+
+*February 19, 2013*
+
+Django 1.4.4 fixes four security issues present in previous Django releases in
+the 1.4 series, as well as several other bugs and numerous documentation
+improvements.
+
+This is the fourth bugfix/security release in the Django 1.4 series.
+
+
+Host header poisoning
+---------------------
+
+Some parts of Django -- independent of end-user-written applications -- make
+use of full URLs, including domain name, which are generated from the HTTP Host
+header. Django's documentation has for some time contained notes advising users
+on how to configure webservers to ensure that only valid Host headers can reach
+the Django application. However, it has been reported to us that even with the
+recommended webserver configurations there are still techniques available for
+tricking many common webservers into supplying the application with an
+incorrect and possibly malicious Host header.
+
+For this reason, Django 1.4.4 adds a new setting, ``ALLOWED_HOSTS``, containing
+an explicit list of valid host/domain names for this site. A request with a
+Host header not matching an entry in this list will raise
+``SuspiciousOperation`` if ``request.get_host()`` is called. For full details
+see the documentation for the :setting:`ALLOWED_HOSTS` setting.
+
+The default value for this setting in Django 1.4.4 is ``['*']`` (matching any
+host), for backwards-compatibility, but we strongly encourage all sites to set
+a more restrictive value.
+
+This host validation is disabled when ``DEBUG`` is ``True`` or when running tests.
+
+
+XML deserialization
+-------------------
+
+The XML parser in the Python standard library is vulnerable to a number of
+attacks via external entities and entity expansion. Django uses this parser for
+deserializing XML-formatted database fixtures. This deserializer is not
+intended for use with untrusted data, but in order to err on the side of safety
+in Django 1.4.4 the XML deserializer refuses to parse an XML document with a
+DTD (DOCTYPE definition), which closes off these attack avenues.
+
+These issues in the Python standard library are CVE-2013-1664 and
+CVE-2013-1665. More information available `from the Python security team`_.
+
+Django's XML serializer does not create documents with a DTD, so this should
+not cause any issues with the typical round-trip from ``dumpdata`` to
+``loaddata``, but if you feed your own XML documents to the ``loaddata``
+management command, you will need to ensure they do not contain a DTD.
+
+.. _from the Python security team: http://blog.python.org/2013/02/announcing-defusedxml-fixes-for-xml.html
+
+
+Formset memory exhaustion
+-------------------------
+
+Previous versions of Django did not validate or limit the form-count data
+provided by the client in a formset's management form, making it possible to
+exhaust a server's available memory by forcing it to create very large numbers
+of forms.
+
+In Django 1.4.4, all formsets have a strictly-enforced maximum number of forms
+(1000 by default, though it can be set higher via the ``max_num`` formset
+factory argument).
+
+
+Admin history view information leakage
+--------------------------------------
+
+In previous versions of Django, an admin user without change permission on a
+model could still view the unicode representation of instances via their admin
+history log. Django 1.4.4 now limits the admin history log view for an object
+to users with change permission for that model.
+
+
+Other bugfixes and changes
+==========================
+
+* Prevented transaction state from leaking from one request to the next (#19707).
+* Changed a SQL command syntax to be MySQL 4 compatible (#19702).
+* Added backwards-compatibility with old unsalted MD5 passwords (#18144).
+* Numerous documentation improvements and fixes.

docs/releases/1.4.5.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+==========================
+Django 1.4.5 release notes
+==========================
+
+*February 20, 2013*
+
+Django 1.4.5 corrects a packaging problem with yesterday's :doc:`1.4.4 release
+</releases/1.4.4>`.
+
+The release contained stray ``.pyc`` files that caused "bad magic number"
+errors when running with some versions of Python. This releases corrects this,
+and also fixes a bad documentation link in the project template ``settings.py``
+file generated by ``manage.py startproject``.

docs/releases/index.txt

@@ -30,6 +30,9 @@ Final releases
 .. toctree::
    :maxdepth: 1
 
+   1.4.5
+   1.4.4
+   1.4.3
    1.4.2
    1.4.1
    1.4
@@ -39,6 +42,11 @@ Final releases
 .. toctree::
    :maxdepth: 1
 
+   1.3.7
+   1.3.6
+   1.3.5
+   1.3.4
+   1.3.3
    1.3.2
    1.3.1
    1.3