mirror of https://github.com/django/django.git
Added information on resolved security issues to release notes.
This commit is contained in:
Erik Romijn
Tim Graham
parent
75c0d4ea3a
commit
c07f3e60c2
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@ -2,7 +2,109 @@
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Django 1.4.11 release notes
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===========================
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*Under development*
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*April 21, 2014*
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Django's vendored version of six, :mod:`django.utils.six`, has been upgraded to
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the latest release (1.6.1).
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Django 1.4.11 fixes three security issues in 1.4.10. Additionally,
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Django's vendored version of six, :mod:`django.utils.six`, has been
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upgraded to the latest release (1.6.1).
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Unexpected code execution using ``reverse()``
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=============================================
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Django's URL handling is based on a mapping of regex patterns
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(representing the URLs) to callable views, and Django's own processing
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consists of matching a requested URL against those patterns to
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determine the appropriate view to invoke.
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Django also provides a convenience function --
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:func:`~django.core.urlresolvers.reverse` -- which performs this process
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in the opposite direction. The ``reverse()`` function takes
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information about a view and returns a URL which would invoke that
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view. Use of ``reverse()`` is encouraged for application developers,
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as the output of ``reverse()`` is always based on the current URL
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patterns, meaning developers do not need to change other code when
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making changes to URLs.
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One argument signature for ``reverse()`` is to pass a dotted Python
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path to the desired view. In this situation, Django will import the
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module indicated by that dotted path as part of generating the
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resulting URL. If such a module has import-time side effects, those
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side effects will occur.
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Thus it is possible for an attacker to cause unexpected code
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execution, given the following conditions:
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1. One or more views are present which construct a URL based on user
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input (commonly, a "next" parameter in a querystring indicating
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where to redirect upon successful completion of an action).
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2. One or more modules are known to an attacker to exist on the
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server's Python import path, which perform code execution with side
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effects on importing.
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To remedy this, ``reverse()`` will now only accept and import dotted
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paths based on the view-containing modules listed in the project's :doc:`URL
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pattern configuration </topics/http/urls>`, so as to ensure that only modules
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the developer intended to be imported in this fashion can or will be imported.
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Caching of anonymous pages could reveal CSRF token
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==================================================
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Django includes both a :doc:`caching framework </topics/cache>` and a system
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for :doc:`preventing cross-site request forgery (CSRF) attacks
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</ref/contrib/csrf/>`. The CSRF-protection system is based on a random nonce
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sent to the client in a cookie which must be sent by the client on future
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requests and, in forms, a hidden value which must be submitted back with the
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form.
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The caching framework includes an option to cache responses to
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anonymous (i.e., unauthenticated) clients.
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When the first anonymous request to a given page is by a client which
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did not have a CSRF cookie, the cache framework will also cache the
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CSRF cookie and serve the same nonce to other anonymous clients who
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do not have a CSRF cookie. This can allow an attacker to obtain a
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valid CSRF cookie value and perform attacks which bypass the check for
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the cookie.
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To remedy this, the caching framework will no longer cache such
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responses. The heuristic for this will be:
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1. If the incoming request did not submit any cookies, and
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2. If the response did send one or more cookies, and
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3. If the ``Vary: Cookie`` header is set on the response, then the
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response will not be cached.
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MySQL typecasting
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=================
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The MySQL database is known to "typecast" on certain queries; for
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example, when querying a table which contains string values, but using
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a query which filters based on an integer value, MySQL will first
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silently coerce the strings to integers and return a result based on that.
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If a query is performed without first converting values to the
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appropriate type, this can produce unexpected results, similar to what
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would occur if the query itself had been manipulated.
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Django's model field classes are aware of their own types and most
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such classes perform explicit conversion of query arguments to the
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correct database-level type before querying. However, three model
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field classes did not correctly convert their arguments:
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* :class:`~django.db.models.FilePathField`
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* :class:`~django.db.models.GenericIPAddressField`
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* :class:`~django.db.models.IPAddressField`
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These three fields have been updated to convert their arguments to the
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correct types before querying.
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Additionally, developers of custom model fields are now warned via
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documentation to ensure their custom field classes will perform
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appropriate type conversions, and users of the :meth:`raw()
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<django.db.models.query.QuerySet.raw>` and :meth:`extra()
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<django.db.models.query.QuerySet.extra>` query methods -- which allow the
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developer to supply raw SQL or SQL fragments -- will be advised to ensure they
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perform appropriate manual type conversions prior to executing queries.
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@ -2,10 +2,111 @@
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Django 1.5.6 release notes
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==========================
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*Under development*
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*April 21, 2014*
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Django's vendored version of six, :mod:`django.utils.six`, has been upgraded to
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the latest release (1.6.1).
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Django 1.5.6 fixes several bugs in 1.5.5, including three security
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issues.
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Unexpected code execution using ``reverse()``
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=============================================
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|
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Django's URL handling is based on a mapping of regex patterns
|
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(representing the URLs) to callable views, and Django's own processing
|
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consists of matching a requested URL against those patterns to
|
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determine the appropriate view to invoke.
|
||||
|
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Django also provides a convenience function --
|
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:func:`~django.core.urlresolvers.reverse` -- which performs this process
|
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in the opposite direction. The ``reverse()`` function takes
|
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information about a view and returns a URL which would invoke that
|
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view. Use of ``reverse()`` is encouraged for application developers,
|
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as the output of ``reverse()`` is always based on the current URL
|
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patterns, meaning developers do not need to change other code when
|
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making changes to URLs.
|
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|
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One argument signature for ``reverse()`` is to pass a dotted Python
|
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path to the desired view. In this situation, Django will import the
|
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module indicated by that dotted path as part of generating the
|
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resulting URL. If such a module has import-time side effects, those
|
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side effects will occur.
|
||||
|
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Thus it is possible for an attacker to cause unexpected code
|
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execution, given the following conditions:
|
||||
|
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1. One or more views are present which construct a URL based on user
|
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input (commonly, a "next" parameter in a querystring indicating
|
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where to redirect upon successful completion of an action).
|
||||
|
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2. One or more modules are known to an attacker to exist on the
|
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server's Python import path, which perform code execution with side
|
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effects on importing.
|
||||
|
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To remedy this, ``reverse()`` will now only accept and import dotted
|
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paths based on the view-containing modules listed in the project's :doc:`URL
|
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pattern configuration </topics/http/urls>`, so as to ensure that only modules
|
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the developer intended to be imported in this fashion can or will be imported.
|
||||
|
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Caching of anonymous pages could reveal CSRF token
|
||||
==================================================
|
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|
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Django includes both a :doc:`caching framework </topics/cache>` and a system
|
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for :doc:`preventing cross-site request forgery (CSRF) attacks
|
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</ref/contrib/csrf/>`. The CSRF-protection system is based on a random nonce
|
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sent to the client in a cookie which must be sent by the client on future
|
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requests and, in forms, a hidden value which must be submitted back with the
|
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form.
|
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|
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The caching framework includes an option to cache responses to
|
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anonymous (i.e., unauthenticated) clients.
|
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|
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When the first anonymous request to a given page is by a client which
|
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did not have a CSRF cookie, the cache framework will also cache the
|
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CSRF cookie and serve the same nonce to other anonymous clients who
|
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do not have a CSRF cookie. This can allow an attacker to obtain a
|
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valid CSRF cookie value and perform attacks which bypass the check for
|
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the cookie.
|
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|
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To remedy this, the caching framework will no longer cache such
|
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responses. The heuristic for this will be:
|
||||
|
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1. If the incoming request did not submit any cookies, and
|
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|
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2. If the response did send one or more cookies, and
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3. If the ``Vary: Cookie`` header is set on the response, then the
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response will not be cached.
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MySQL typecasting
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=================
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|
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The MySQL database is known to "typecast" on certain queries; for
|
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example, when querying a table which contains string values, but using
|
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a query which filters based on an integer value, MySQL will first
|
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silently coerce the strings to integers and return a result based on that.
|
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|
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If a query is performed without first converting values to the
|
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appropriate type, this can produce unexpected results, similar to what
|
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would occur if the query itself had been manipulated.
|
||||
|
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Django's model field classes are aware of their own types and most
|
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such classes perform explicit conversion of query arguments to the
|
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correct database-level type before querying. However, three model
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field classes did not correctly convert their arguments:
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|
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* :class:`~django.db.models.FilePathField`
|
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* :class:`~django.db.models.GenericIPAddressField`
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* :class:`~django.db.models.IPAddressField`
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|
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These three fields have been updated to convert their arguments to the
|
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correct types before querying.
|
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|
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Additionally, developers of custom model fields are now warned via
|
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documentation to ensure their custom field classes will perform
|
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appropriate type conversions, and users of the :meth:`raw()
|
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<django.db.models.query.QuerySet.raw>` and :meth:`extra()
|
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<django.db.models.query.QuerySet.extra>` query methods -- which allow the
|
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developer to supply raw SQL or SQL fragments -- will be advised to ensure they
|
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perform appropriate manual type conversions prior to executing queries.
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Bugfixes
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========
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@ -13,3 +114,6 @@ Bugfixes
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* Fixed :class:`~django.contrib.auth.backends.ModelBackend` raising
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``UnboundLocalError`` if :func:`~django.contrib.auth.get_user_model`
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raised an error (#21439).
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Additionally, Django's vendored version of six, :mod:`django.utils.six`,
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has been upgraded to the latest release (1.6.1).
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|
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@ -2,10 +2,111 @@
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Django 1.6.3 release notes
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==========================
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*Under development*
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*April 21, 2014*
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This is Django 1.6.3, a bugfix release for Django 1.6. Django 1.6.3 fixes
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several bugs in 1.6.2 and makes one backwards-incompatible change:
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Django 1.6.3 fixes several bugs in 1.6.2, including three security issues,
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and makes one backwards-incompatible change:
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Unexpected code execution using ``reverse()``
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=============================================
|
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|
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Django's URL handling is based on a mapping of regex patterns
|
||||
(representing the URLs) to callable views, and Django's own processing
|
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consists of matching a requested URL against those patterns to
|
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determine the appropriate view to invoke.
|
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|
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Django also provides a convenience function --
|
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:func:`~django.core.urlresolvers.reverse` -- which performs this process
|
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in the opposite direction. The ``reverse()`` function takes
|
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information about a view and returns a URL which would invoke that
|
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view. Use of ``reverse()`` is encouraged for application developers,
|
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as the output of ``reverse()`` is always based on the current URL
|
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patterns, meaning developers do not need to change other code when
|
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making changes to URLs.
|
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|
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One argument signature for ``reverse()`` is to pass a dotted Python
|
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path to the desired view. In this situation, Django will import the
|
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module indicated by that dotted path as part of generating the
|
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resulting URL. If such a module has import-time side effects, those
|
||||
side effects will occur.
|
||||
|
||||
Thus it is possible for an attacker to cause unexpected code
|
||||
execution, given the following conditions:
|
||||
|
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1. One or more views are present which construct a URL based on user
|
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input (commonly, a "next" parameter in a querystring indicating
|
||||
where to redirect upon successful completion of an action).
|
||||
|
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2. One or more modules are known to an attacker to exist on the
|
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server's Python import path, which perform code execution with side
|
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effects on importing.
|
||||
|
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To remedy this, ``reverse()`` will now only accept and import dotted
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paths based on the view-containing modules listed in the project's :doc:`URL
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pattern configuration </topics/http/urls>`, so as to ensure that only modules
|
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the developer intended to be imported in this fashion can or will be imported.
|
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|
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Caching of anonymous pages could reveal CSRF token
|
||||
==================================================
|
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|
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Django includes both a :doc:`caching framework </topics/cache>` and a system
|
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for :doc:`preventing cross-site request forgery (CSRF) attacks
|
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</ref/contrib/csrf/>`. The CSRF-protection system is based on a random nonce
|
||||
sent to the client in a cookie which must be sent by the client on future
|
||||
requests and, in forms, a hidden value which must be submitted back with the
|
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form.
|
||||
|
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The caching framework includes an option to cache responses to
|
||||
anonymous (i.e., unauthenticated) clients.
|
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|
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When the first anonymous request to a given page is by a client which
|
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did not have a CSRF cookie, the cache framework will also cache the
|
||||
CSRF cookie and serve the same nonce to other anonymous clients who
|
||||
do not have a CSRF cookie. This can allow an attacker to obtain a
|
||||
valid CSRF cookie value and perform attacks which bypass the check for
|
||||
the cookie.
|
||||
|
||||
To remedy this, the caching framework will no longer cache such
|
||||
responses. The heuristic for this will be:
|
||||
|
||||
1. If the incoming request did not submit any cookies, and
|
||||
|
||||
2. If the response did send one or more cookies, and
|
||||
|
||||
3. If the ``Vary: Cookie`` header is set on the response, then the
|
||||
response will not be cached.
|
||||
|
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MySQL typecasting
|
||||
=================
|
||||
|
||||
The MySQL database is known to "typecast" on certain queries; for
|
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example, when querying a table which contains string values, but using
|
||||
a query which filters based on an integer value, MySQL will first
|
||||
silently coerce the strings to integers and return a result based on that.
|
||||
|
||||
If a query is performed without first converting values to the
|
||||
appropriate type, this can produce unexpected results, similar to what
|
||||
would occur if the query itself had been manipulated.
|
||||
|
||||
Django's model field classes are aware of their own types and most
|
||||
such classes perform explicit conversion of query arguments to the
|
||||
correct database-level type before querying. However, three model
|
||||
field classes did not correctly convert their arguments:
|
||||
|
||||
* :class:`~django.db.models.FilePathField`
|
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* :class:`~django.db.models.GenericIPAddressField`
|
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* :class:`~django.db.models.IPAddressField`
|
||||
|
||||
These three fields have been updated to convert their arguments to the
|
||||
correct types before querying.
|
||||
|
||||
Additionally, developers of custom model fields are now warned via
|
||||
documentation to ensure their custom field classes will perform
|
||||
appropriate type conversions, and users of the :meth:`raw()
|
||||
<django.db.models.query.QuerySet.raw>` and :meth:`extra()
|
||||
<django.db.models.query.QuerySet.extra>` query methods -- which allow the
|
||||
developer to supply raw SQL or SQL fragments -- will be advised to ensure they
|
||||
perform appropriate manual type conversions prior to executing queries.
|
||||
|
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``select_for_update()`` requires a transaction
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||||
==============================================
|
||||
|
|
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|||
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