mirror of https://github.com/django/django.git
[2.0.x] Fixed CVE-2018-6188 -- Fixed information leakage in AuthenticationForm.
Reverted 359370a8b8
(refs #28645).
This is a security fix.
This commit is contained in:
parent
1bd45e2458
commit
c37bb28677
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@ -194,15 +194,6 @@ class AuthenticationForm(forms.Form):
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if username is not None and password:
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self.user_cache = authenticate(self.request, username=username, password=password)
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if self.user_cache is None:
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# An authentication backend may reject inactive users. Check
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# if the user exists and is inactive, and raise the 'inactive'
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# error if so.
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try:
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self.user_cache = UserModel._default_manager.get_by_natural_key(username)
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except UserModel.DoesNotExist:
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pass
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else:
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self.confirm_login_allowed(self.user_cache)
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raise forms.ValidationError(
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self.error_messages['invalid_login'],
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code='invalid_login',
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@ -2,9 +2,28 @@
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Django 1.11.10 release notes
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============================
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*Expected February 1, 2018*
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*February 1, 2018*
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Django 1.11.10 fixes several bugs in 1.11.9.
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Django 1.11.10 fixes a security issue and several bugs in 1.11.9.
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CVE-2018-6188: Information leakage in ``AuthenticationForm``
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============================================================
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A regression in Django 1.11.8 made
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:class:`~django.contrib.auth.forms.AuthenticationForm` run its
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``confirm_login_allowed()`` method even if an incorrect password is entered.
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This can leak information about a user, depending on what messages
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``confirm_login_allowed()`` raises. If ``confirm_login_allowed()`` isn't
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overridden, an attacker enter an arbitrary username and see if that user has
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been set to ``is_active=False``. If ``confirm_login_allowed()`` is overridden,
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more sensitive details could be leaked.
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This issue is fixed with the caveat that ``AuthenticationForm`` can no longer
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raise the "This account is inactive." error if the authentication backend
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rejects inactive users (the default authentication backend, ``ModelBackend``,
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has done that since Django 1.10). This issue will be revisited for Django 2.1
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as a fix to address the caveat will likely be too invasive for inclusion in
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older versions.
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Bugfixes
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========
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@ -2,9 +2,28 @@
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Django 2.0.2 release notes
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==========================
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*Expected February 1, 2018*
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*February 1, 2018*
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Django 2.0.2 fixes several bugs in 2.0.1.
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Django 2.0.2 fixes a security issue and several bugs in 2.0.1.
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CVE-2018-6188: Information leakage in ``AuthenticationForm``
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============================================================
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A regression in Django 1.11.8 made
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:class:`~django.contrib.auth.forms.AuthenticationForm` run its
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``confirm_login_allowed()`` method even if an incorrect password is entered.
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This can leak information about a user, depending on what messages
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``confirm_login_allowed()`` raises. If ``confirm_login_allowed()`` isn't
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overridden, an attacker enter an arbitrary username and see if that user has
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been set to ``is_active=False``. If ``confirm_login_allowed()`` is overridden,
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more sensitive details could be leaked.
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This issue is fixed with the caveat that ``AuthenticationForm`` can no longer
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raise the "This account is inactive." error if the authentication backend
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rejects inactive users (the default authentication backend, ``ModelBackend``,
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has done that since Django 1.10). This issue will be revisited for Django 2.1
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as a fix to address the caveat will likely be too invasive for inclusion in
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older versions.
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Bugfixes
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========
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@ -262,6 +262,9 @@ class UserCreationFormTest(TestDataMixin, TestCase):
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)
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# To verify that the login form rejects inactive users, use an authentication
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# backend that allows them.
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@override_settings(AUTHENTICATION_BACKENDS=['django.contrib.auth.backends.AllowAllUsersModelBackend'])
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class AuthenticationFormTest(TestDataMixin, TestCase):
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def test_invalid_username(self):
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@ -291,6 +294,24 @@ class AuthenticationFormTest(TestDataMixin, TestCase):
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self.assertFalse(form.is_valid())
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self.assertEqual(form.non_field_errors(), [str(form.error_messages['inactive'])])
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# Use an authentication backend that rejects inactive users.
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@override_settings(AUTHENTICATION_BACKENDS=['django.contrib.auth.backends.ModelBackend'])
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def test_inactive_user_incorrect_password(self):
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"""An invalid login doesn't leak the inactive status of a user."""
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data = {
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'username': 'inactive',
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'password': 'incorrect',
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}
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form = AuthenticationForm(None, data)
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self.assertFalse(form.is_valid())
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self.assertEqual(
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form.non_field_errors(), [
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form.error_messages['invalid_login'] % {
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'username': User._meta.get_field('username').verbose_name
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}
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]
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)
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def test_login_failed(self):
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signal_calls = []
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