mirror of https://github.com/django/django.git
Added proper code comments for the HTTPS CSRF protection.
Refs #13489 which noticed a vague comment - thanks pmclanahan git-svn-id: http://code.djangoproject.com/svn/django/trunk@13405 bcc190cf-cafb-0310-a4f2-bffc1f526a37
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@ -126,13 +126,27 @@ class CsrfViewMiddleware(object):
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return accept()
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if request.is_secure():
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# Strict referer checking for HTTPS
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# Suppose user visits http://example.com/
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# An active network attacker,(man-in-the-middle, MITM) sends a
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# POST form which targets https://example.com/detonate-bomb/ and
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# submits it via javascript.
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#
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# The attacker will need to provide a CSRF cookie and token, but
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# that is no problem for a MITM and the session independent
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# nonce we are using. So the MITM can circumvent the CSRF
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# protection. This is true for any HTTP connection, but anyone
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# using HTTPS expects better! For this reason, for
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# https://example.com/ we need additional protection that treats
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# http://example.com/ as completely untrusted. Under HTTPS,
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# Barth et al. found that the Referer header is missing for
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# same-domain requests in only about 0.2% of cases or less, so
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# we can use strict Referer checking.
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referer = request.META.get('HTTP_REFERER')
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if referer is None:
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return reject("Referer checking failed - no Referer.")
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# The following check ensures that the referer is HTTPS,
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# the domains match and the ports match. This might be too strict.
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# the domains match and the ports match - the same origin policy.
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good_referer = 'https://%s/' % request.get_host()
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if not referer.startswith(good_referer):
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return reject("Referer checking failed - %s does not match %s." %
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