[3.1.x] Fixed CVE-2021-33203 -- Fixed potential path-traversal via admindocs' TemplateDetailView.
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@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ from django.db import models
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from django.http import Http404
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from django.template.engine import Engine
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from django.urls import get_mod_func, get_resolver, get_urlconf
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from django.utils._os import safe_join
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from django.utils.decorators import method_decorator
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from django.utils.inspect import (
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func_accepts_kwargs, func_accepts_var_args, get_func_full_args,
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@ -329,7 +330,7 @@ class TemplateDetailView(BaseAdminDocsView):
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else:
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# This doesn't account for template loaders (#24128).
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for index, directory in enumerate(default_engine.dirs):
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template_file = Path(directory) / template
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template_file = Path(safe_join(directory, template))
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if template_file.exists():
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template_contents = template_file.read_text()
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else:
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@ -6,4 +6,14 @@ Django 2.2.24 release notes
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Django 2.2.24 fixes two security issues in 2.2.23.
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...
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CVE-2021-33203: Potential directory traversal via ``admindocs``
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===============================================================
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Staff members could use the :mod:`~django.contrib.admindocs`
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``TemplateDetailView`` view to check the existence of arbitrary files.
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Additionally, if (and only if) the default admindocs templates have been
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customized by the developers to also expose the file contents, then not only
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the existence but also the file contents would have been exposed.
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As a mitigation, path sanitation is now applied and only files within the
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template root directories can be loaded.
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@ -6,4 +6,14 @@ Django 3.1.12 release notes
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Django 3.1.12 fixes two security issues in 3.1.11.
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...
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CVE-2021-33203: Potential directory traversal via ``admindocs``
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===============================================================
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Staff members could use the :mod:`~django.contrib.admindocs`
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``TemplateDetailView`` view to check the existence of arbitrary files.
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Additionally, if (and only if) the default admindocs templates have been
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customized by the developers to also expose the file contents, then not only
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the existence but also the file contents would have been exposed.
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As a mitigation, path sanitation is now applied and only files within the
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template root directories can be loaded.
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@ -137,6 +137,22 @@ class AdminDocViewTests(TestDataMixin, AdminDocsTestCase):
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self.assertContains(response, 'View documentation')
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@unittest.skipUnless(utils.docutils_is_available, 'no docutils installed.')
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class AdminDocViewDefaultEngineOnly(TestDataMixin, AdminDocsTestCase):
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def setUp(self):
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self.client.force_login(self.superuser)
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def test_template_detail_path_traversal(self):
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cases = ['/etc/passwd', '../passwd']
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for fpath in cases:
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with self.subTest(path=fpath):
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response = self.client.get(
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reverse('django-admindocs-templates', args=[fpath]),
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)
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self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 400)
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@override_settings(TEMPLATES=[{
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'NAME': 'ONE',
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'BACKEND': 'django.template.backends.django.DjangoTemplates',
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