452 lines
21 KiB
Plaintext
452 lines
21 KiB
Plaintext
=====================================
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Cross Site Request Forgery protection
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=====================================
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.. module:: django.middleware.csrf
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:synopsis: Protects against Cross Site Request Forgeries
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The CSRF middleware and template tag provides easy-to-use protection against
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`Cross Site Request Forgeries`_. This type of attack occurs when a malicious
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Web site contains a link, a form button or some javascript that is intended to
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perform some action on your Web site, using the credentials of a logged-in user
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who visits the malicious site in their browser. A related type of attack,
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'login CSRF', where an attacking site tricks a user's browser into logging into
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a site with someone else's credentials, is also covered.
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The first defense against CSRF attacks is to ensure that GET requests are
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side-effect free. POST requests can then be protected by following the steps
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below.
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.. versionadded:: 1.2
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The 'contrib' apps, including the admin, use the functionality described
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here. Because it is security related, a few things have been added to core
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functionality to allow this to happen without any required upgrade steps.
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.. _Cross Site Request Forgeries: http://www.squarefree.com/securitytips/web-developers.html#CSRF
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How to use it
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=============
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.. versionchanged:: 1.2
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The template tag functionality (the recommended way to use this) was added
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in version 1.2. The previous method (still available) is described under
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`Legacy method`_.
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To enable CSRF protection for your views, follow these steps:
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1. Add the middleware
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``'django.middleware.csrf.CsrfViewMiddleware'`` to your list of
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middleware classes, :setting:`MIDDLEWARE_CLASSES`. (It should come
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before ``CsrfResponseMiddleware`` if that is being used, and before any
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view middleware that assume that CSRF attacks have been dealt with.)
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Alternatively, you can use the decorator
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``django.views.decorators.csrf.csrf_protect`` on particular views you
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want to protect (see below).
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2. In any template that uses a POST form, use the :ttag:`csrf_token` tag inside
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the ``<form>`` element if the form is for an internal URL, e.g.::
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<form action="" method="post">{% csrf_token %}
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This should not be done for POST forms that target external URLs, since
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that would cause the CSRF token to be leaked, leading to a vulnerability.
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3. In the corresponding view functions, ensure that the
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``'django.core.context_processors.csrf'`` context processor is
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being used. Usually, this can be done in one of two ways:
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1. Use RequestContext, which always uses
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``'django.core.context_processors.csrf'`` (no matter what your
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TEMPLATE_CONTEXT_PROCESSORS setting). If you are using
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generic views or contrib apps, you are covered already, since these
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apps use RequestContext throughout.
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2. Manually import and use the processor to generate the CSRF token and
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add it to the template context. e.g.::
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from django.core.context_processors import csrf
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from django.shortcuts import render_to_response
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def my_view(request):
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c = {}
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c.update(csrf(request))
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# ... view code here
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return render_to_response("a_template.html", c)
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You may want to write your own ``render_to_response`` wrapper that
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takes care of this step for you.
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The utility script ``extras/csrf_migration_helper.py`` can help to automate the
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finding of code and templates that may need to be upgraded. It contains full
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help on how to use it.
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AJAX
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----
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While the above method can be used for AJAX POST requests, it has some
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inconveniences: you have to remember to pass the CSRF token in as POST data with
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every POST request. For this reason, there is an alternative method: on each
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XMLHttpRequest, set a custom `X-CSRFToken` header to the value of the CSRF
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token. This is often easier, because many javascript frameworks provide hooks
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that allow headers to be set on every request. In jQuery, you can use the
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``beforeSend`` hook as follows:
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.. code-block:: javascript
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$.ajaxSetup({
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beforeSend: function(xhr, settings) {
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function getCookie(name) {
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var cookieValue = null;
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if (document.cookie && document.cookie != '') {
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var cookies = document.cookie.split(';');
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for (var i = 0; i < cookies.length; i++) {
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var cookie = jQuery.trim(cookies[i]);
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// Does this cookie string begin with the name we want?
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if (cookie.substring(0, name.length + 1) == (name + '=')) {
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cookieValue = decodeURIComponent(cookie.substring(name.length + 1));
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break;
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}
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}
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}
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return cookieValue;
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}
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if (!(/^http:.*/.test(settings.url) || /^https:.*/.test(settings.url))) {
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// Only send the token to relative URLs i.e. locally.
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xhr.setRequestHeader("X-CSRFToken", getCookie('csrftoken'));
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}
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}
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});
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Adding this to a javascript file that is included on your site will ensure that
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AJAX POST requests that are made via jQuery will not be caught by the CSRF
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protection.
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The decorator method
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--------------------
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Rather than adding ``CsrfViewMiddleware`` as a blanket protection, you can use
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the ``csrf_protect`` decorator, which has exactly the same functionality, on
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particular views that need the protection. It must be used **both** on views
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that insert the CSRF token in the output, and on those that accept the POST form
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data. (These are often the same view function, but not always). It is used like
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this::
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from django.views.decorators.csrf import csrf_protect
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from django.template import RequestContext
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@csrf_protect
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def my_view(request):
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c = {}
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# ...
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return render_to_response("a_template.html", c,
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context_instance=RequestContext(request))
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Use of the decorator is **not recommended** by itself, since if you forget to
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use it, you will have a security hole. The 'belt and braces' strategy of using
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both is fine, and will incur minimal overhead.
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Legacy method
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-------------
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In Django 1.1, the template tag did not exist. Instead, a post-processing
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middleware that re-wrote POST forms to include the CSRF token was used. If you
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are upgrading a site from version 1.1 or earlier, please read this section and
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the `Upgrading notes`_ below. The post-processing middleware is still available
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as ``CsrfResponseMiddleware``, and it can be used by following these steps:
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1. Follow step 1 above to install ``CsrfViewMiddleware``.
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2. Add ``'django.middleware.csrf.CsrfResponseMiddleware'`` to your
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:setting:`MIDDLEWARE_CLASSES` setting.
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``CsrfResponseMiddleware`` needs to process the response before things
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like compression or setting ofETags happen to the response, so it must
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come after ``GZipMiddleware``, ``CommonMiddleware`` and
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``ConditionalGetMiddleware`` in the list. It also must come after
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``CsrfViewMiddleware``.
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Use of the ``CsrfResponseMiddleware`` is not recommended because of the
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performance hit it imposes, and because of a potential security problem (see
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below). It can be used as an interim measure until applications have been
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updated to use the :ttag:`csrf_token` tag. It is deprecated and will be
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removed in Django 1.4.
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Django 1.1 and earlier provided a single ``CsrfMiddleware`` class. This is also
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still available for backwards compatibility. It combines the functions of the
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two middleware.
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Note also that previous versions of these classes depended on the sessions
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framework, but this dependency has now been removed, with backward compatibility
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support so that upgrading will not produce any issues.
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Security of legacy method
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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The post-processing ``CsrfResponseMiddleware`` adds the CSRF token to all POST
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forms (unless the view has been decorated with ``csrf_response_exempt``). If
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the POST form has an external untrusted site as its target, rather than an
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internal page, that site will be sent the CSRF token when the form is submitted.
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Armed with this leaked information, that site will then be able to successfully
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launch a CSRF attack on your site against that user. The
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``@csrf_response_exempt`` decorator can be used to fix this, but only if the
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page doesn't also contain internal forms that require the token.
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.. _ref-csrf-upgrading-notes:
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Upgrading notes
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---------------
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When upgrading to version 1.2 or later, you may have applications that rely on
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the old post-processing functionality for CSRF protection, or you may not have
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enabled any CSRF protection. This section outlines the steps necessary for a
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smooth upgrade, without having to fix all the applications to use the new
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template tag method immediately.
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First of all, the location of the middleware and related functions have
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changed. There are backwards compatible stub files so that old imports will
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continue to work for now, but they are deprecated and will be removed in Django
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1.4. The following changes have been made:
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* Middleware have been moved to ``django.middleware.csrf``
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* Decorators have been moved to ``django.views.decorators.csrf``
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====================================================== ==============================================
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Old New
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====================================================== ==============================================
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django.contrib.csrf.middleware.CsrfMiddleware django.middleware.csrf.CsrfMiddleware
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django.contrib.csrf.middleware.CsrfViewMiddleware django.middleware.csrf.CsrfViewMiddleware
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django.contrib.csrf.middleware.CsrfResponseMiddleware django.middleware.csrf.CsrfResponseMiddleware
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django.contrib.csrf.middleware.csrf_exempt django.views.decorators.csrf.csrf_exempt
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django.contrib.csrf.middleware.csrf_view_exempt django.views.decorators.csrf.csrf_view_exempt
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django.contrib.csrf.middleware.csrf_response_exempt django.views.decorators.csrf.csrf_response_exempt
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====================================================== ==============================================
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You should update any imports, and also the paths in your
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:setting:`MIDDLEWARE_CLASSES`.
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If you have ``CsrfMiddleware`` in your :setting:`MIDDLEWARE_CLASSES`, you will now
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have a working installation with CSRF protection. It is recommended at this
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point that you replace ``CsrfMiddleware`` with its two components,
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``CsrfViewMiddleware`` and ``CsrfResponseMiddleware`` (in that order).
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If you do not have any of the middleware in your :setting:`MIDDLEWARE_CLASSES`,
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you will have a working installation but without any CSRF protection for your
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views (just as you had before). It is strongly recommended to install
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``CsrfViewMiddleware`` and ``CsrfResponseMiddleware``, as described above.
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Note that contrib apps, such as the admin, have been updated to use the
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``csrf_protect`` decorator, so that they are secured even if you do not add the
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``CsrfViewMiddleware`` to your settings. However, if you have supplied
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customised templates to any of the view functions of contrib apps (whether
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explicitly via a keyword argument, or by overriding built-in templates), **you
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MUST update them** to include the :ttag:`csrf_token` template tag as described
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above, or they will stop working. (If you cannot update these templates for
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some reason, you will be forced to use ``CsrfResponseMiddleware`` for these
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views to continue working).
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Note also, if you are using the comments app, and you are not going to add
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``CsrfViewMiddleware`` to your settings (not recommended), you will need to add
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the ``csrf_protect`` decorator to any views that include the comment forms and
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target the comment views (usually using the :ttag:`comment_form_target` template
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tag).
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Assuming you have followed the above, all views in your Django site will now be
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protected by the ``CsrfViewMiddleware``. Contrib apps meet the requirements
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imposed by the ``CsrfViewMiddleware`` using the template tag, and other
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applications in your project will meet its requirements by virtue of the
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``CsrfResponseMiddleware``.
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The next step is to update all your applications to use the template tag, as
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described in `How to use it`_, steps 2-3. This can be done as soon as is
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practical. Any applications that are updated will now require Django 1.1.2 or
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later, since they will use the CSRF template tag which was not available in
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earlier versions. (The template tag in 1.1.2 is actually a no-op that exists
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solely to ease the transition to 1.2 — it allows apps to be created that have
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CSRF protection under 1.2 without requiring users of the apps to upgrade to the
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Django 1.2.X series).
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The utility script ``extras/csrf_migration_helper.py`` can help to automate the
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finding of code and templates that may need to be upgraded. It contains full
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help on how to use it.
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Finally, once all applications are upgraded, ``CsrfResponseMiddleware`` can be
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removed from your settings.
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While ``CsrfResponseMiddleware`` is still in use, the ``csrf_response_exempt``
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decorator, described in `Exceptions`_, may be useful. The post-processing
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middleware imposes a performance hit and a potential vulnerability, and any
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views that have been upgraded to use the new template tag method no longer need
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it.
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Exceptions
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----------
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.. versionchanged:: 1.2
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Import paths for the decorators below were changed.
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To manually exclude a view function from being handled by either of the two CSRF
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middleware, you can use the ``csrf_exempt`` decorator, found in the
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``django.views.decorators.csrf`` module. For example::
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from django.views.decorators.csrf import csrf_exempt
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@csrf_exempt
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def my_view(request):
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return HttpResponse('Hello world')
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Like the middleware, the ``csrf_exempt`` decorator is composed of two parts: a
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``csrf_view_exempt`` decorator and a ``csrf_response_exempt`` decorator, found
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in the same module. These disable the view protection mechanism
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(``CsrfViewMiddleware``) and the response post-processing
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(``CsrfResponseMiddleware``) respectively. They can be used individually if
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required.
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Subdomains
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----------
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By default, CSRF cookies are specific to the subdomain they are set for. This
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means that a form served from one subdomain (e.g. server1.example.com) will not
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be able to have a target on another subdomain (e.g. server2.example.com). This
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restriction can be removed by setting :setting:`CSRF_COOKIE_DOMAIN` to be
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something like ``".example.com"``.
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Please note that, with or without use of this setting, this CSRF protection
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mechanism is not safe against cross-subdomain attacks -- see `Limitations`_.
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Rejected requests
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=================
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By default, a '403 Forbidden' response is sent to the user if an incoming
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request fails the checks performed by ``CsrfViewMiddleware``. This should
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usually only be seen when there is a genuine Cross Site Request Forgery, or
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when, due to a programming error, the CSRF token has not been included with a
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POST form.
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No logging is done, and the error message is not very friendly, so you may want
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to provide your own page for handling this condition. To do this, simply set
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the :setting:`CSRF_FAILURE_VIEW` setting to a dotted path to your own view
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function, which should have the following signature::
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def csrf_failure(request, reason="")
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where ``reason`` is a short message (intended for developers or logging, not for
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end users) indicating the reason the request was rejected.
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How it works
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============
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The CSRF protection is based on the following things:
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1. A CSRF cookie that is set to a random value (a session independent nonce, as
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it is called), which other sites will not have access to.
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This cookie is set by ``CsrfViewMiddleware``. It is meant to be permanent,
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but since there is no way to set a cookie that never expires, it is sent with
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every response that has called ``django.middleware.csrf.get_token()``
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(the function used internally to retrieve the CSRF token).
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2. A hidden form field with the name 'csrfmiddlewaretoken' present in all
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outgoing POST forms. The value of this field is the value of the CSRF
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cookie.
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This part is done by the template tag (and with the legacy method, it is done
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by ``CsrfResponseMiddleware``).
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3. For all incoming POST requests, a CSRF cookie must be present, and the
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'csrfmiddlewaretoken' field must be present and correct. If it isn't, the
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user will get a 403 error.
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This check is done by ``CsrfViewMiddleware``.
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4. In addition, for HTTPS requests, strict referer checking is done by
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``CsrfViewMiddleware``. This is necessary to address a Man-In-The-Middle
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attack that is possible under HTTPS when using a session independent nonce,
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due to the fact that HTTP 'Set-Cookie' headers are (unfortunately) accepted
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by clients that are talking to a site under HTTPS. (Referer checking is not
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done for HTTP requests because the presence of the Referer header is not
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reliable enough under HTTP.)
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This ensures that only forms that have originated from your Web site can be used
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to POST data back.
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It deliberately only targets HTTP POST requests (and the corresponding POST
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forms). GET requests ought never to have any potentially dangerous side effects
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(see `9.1.1 Safe Methods, HTTP 1.1, RFC 2616`_), and so a CSRF attack with a GET
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request ought to be harmless.
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``CsrfResponseMiddleware`` checks the Content-Type before modifying the
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response, and only pages that are served as 'text/html' or
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'application/xml+xhtml' are modified.
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.. _9.1.1 Safe Methods, HTTP 1.1, RFC 2616: http://www.w3.org/Protocols/rfc2616/rfc2616-sec9.html
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Caching
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=======
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If the :ttag:`csrf_token` template tag is used by a template (or the ``get_token``
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function is called some other way), ``CsrfViewMiddleware`` will add a cookie and
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a ``Vary: Cookie`` header to the response. Similarly,
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``CsrfResponseMiddleware`` will send the ``Vary: Cookie`` header if it inserted
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a token. This means that these middleware will play well with the cache
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middleware if it is used as instructed (``UpdateCacheMiddleware`` goes before
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all other middleware).
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However, if you use cache decorators on individual views, the CSRF middleware
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will not yet have been able to set the Vary header. In this case, on any views
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that will require a CSRF token to be inserted you should use the
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:func:`django.views.decorators.vary.vary_on_cookie` decorator first::
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from django.views.decorators.cache import cache_page
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from django.views.decorators.vary import vary_on_cookie
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@cache_page(60 * 15)
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@vary_on_cookie
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def my_view(request):
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# ...
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Testing
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=======
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The ``CsrfViewMiddleware`` will usually be a big hindrance to testing view
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functions, due to the need for the CSRF token which must be sent with every POST
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request. For this reason, Django's HTTP client for tests has been modified to
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set a flag on requests which relaxes the middleware and the ``csrf_protect``
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decorator so that they no longer rejects requests. In every other respect
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(e.g. sending cookies etc.), they behave the same.
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If, for some reason, you *want* the test client to perform CSRF
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checks, you can create an instance of the test client that enforces
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CSRF checks::
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>>> from django.test import Client
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>>> csrf_client = Client(enforce_csrf_checks=True)
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Limitations
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===========
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Subdomains within a site will be able to set cookies on the client for the whole
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domain. By setting the cookie and using a corresponding token, subdomains will
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be able to circumvent the CSRF protection. The only way to avoid this is to
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ensure that subdomains are controlled by trusted users (or, are at least unable
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to set cookies). Note that even without CSRF, there are other vulnerabilities,
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such as session fixation, that make giving subdomains to untrusted parties a bad
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idea, and these vulnerabilities cannot easily be fixed with current browsers.
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If you are using ``CsrfResponseMiddleware`` and your app creates HTML pages and
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forms in some unusual way, (e.g. it sends fragments of HTML in JavaScript
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document.write statements) you might bypass the filter that adds the hidden
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field to the form, in which case form submission will always fail. You should
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use the template tag or :meth:`django.middleware.csrf.get_token` to get
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the CSRF token and ensure it is included when your form is submitted.
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Contrib and reusable apps
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=========================
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Because it is possible for the developer to turn off the ``CsrfViewMiddleware``,
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all relevant views in contrib apps use the ``csrf_protect`` decorator to ensure
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the security of these applications against CSRF. It is recommended that the
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developers of other reusable apps that want the same guarantees also use the
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``csrf_protect`` decorator on their views.
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